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The Evidence of Things Not Seen:  
Divining Balancing Factors from Kiobel’s 
“Touch and Concern” Test 
Ursula Tracy Doyle* 
The long awaited Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum raised 
the bar for human rights plaintiffs seeking redress under the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”), a statute which provides jurisdiction in U.S. district courts for foreign 
nationals alleging a tort in violation of customary international law. Prior to Kiobel, the 
typical ATS case alleged atrocities against corporate actors based upon events that 
occurred largely, if not entirely, outside of the United States. In Kiobel, however, the 
Supreme Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS 
and that this presumption precludes claims brought pursuant to the statute unless they 
“touch and concern” the United States sufficiently to overcome the presumption. The 
Court, though, did not define “touch and concern,” implicitly inviting lower courts to 
do so.  
 
This Article suggests that courts determine that a claim touches and concerns the 
United States pursuant to a multifactor balancing test drawn from inferences in the 
Kiobel majority opinion, stated preferences in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, and 
international jurisdictional norms more broadly. Despite Kiobel’s arrival, judges, 
advocates, and litigants now await clarification on the meaning of its “touch and 
concern” test. This Article endeavors to provide a cogent and practical interpretation.  
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law (Chase), Northern Kentucky 
University; J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law; M.A., Columbia University; A.B., 
Cornell University. I thank Nancy Firak, Jon Garon, David Moore, Mark Stavsky, and the participants 
in the Chase Faculty Workshop for their considered critique of an earlier draft of this paper. Any and 
all errors herein are, of course, my own. 
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Introduction 
The second of the certified questions was straightforward: 
“[W]hether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause 
of action under the [Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)], for violations of the 
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.”1 But, in answering that question in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.,2 the Supreme Court largely demurred, leaving the 
teeming masses to wonder precisely “under what circumstances” the 
ATS applies to extraterritorial harm.3 The ATS states, in toto, “[t]he 
 
 1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013). 
 2. There, several Nigerians sued Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a Dutch corporation, Shell Transport 
and Trading Company, P.L.C., a British corporation, and Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria, Ltd. (“SPDC”), a Nigerian corporation, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, asserting jurisdiction under the ATS, for, allegedly, aiding and abetting the Nigerian 
government in killing, raping, torturing, and otherwise abusing residents of Nigeria’s Ogoniland, a region 
near the Niger Delta. Id. at 1662–63. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants’ actions were in 
response to protests in that region against the SPDC for environmental degradation. Id. at 1662. The 
plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants provided the government with the means to accomplish the 
attacks, including compensation, transportation, and food. Id. at 1662–63. The district court dismissed 
claims based upon allegations that did not seem to be customary international law violations but did not 
dismiss all claims. Id. at 1663. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed 
plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety on the ground that corporations cannot be sued pursuant to the ATS. 
Id. (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 3. Id. at 1663; Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (noting that “the Court failed to provide guidance regarding what is 
necessary to satisfy the ‘touch and concern’ standard”). 
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district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”4 The public receives little guidance in 
knowing that this statute only applies to foreign conduct if the claim that 
emerges from the conduct “touch[es] and concern[s]”5 the United States 
“with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial[ity],”6 as the Court opined in a coda.7 The Court did not 
define this “touch and concern” test8 but implicitly invited lower courts 
to do so.9 It did suggest, however, that if “relevant conduct”10 concerning 
the claim brought pursuant to the ATS took place in the United States, 
that conduct would satisfy the touch and concern test.11 The Court, 
however, did not define relevant conduct. 
This Article submits that courts should use a multifactor balancing 
test to determine whether a claim touches and concerns the United 
States. The proposed factors—drawn from inferences in the Kiobel 
 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2014). The ATS was enacted in 1789 as a part of the First Judiciary Act to 
provide jurisdiction over the customary international law violations then recognized; for example, 
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1666 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)); see Curtis A. Bradley, State Action 
and Corporate Human Rights Liability, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1823, 1823–25 (2010). 
 5. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 6. Id. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction. Id. at 1664. 
It means simply that if the relevant statute does not clearly speak to its extraterritorial application, “it 
has none.” Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). In Kiobel, the 
Supreme Court observed that “[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality guards against our courts 
triggering . . . serious foreign policy consequences, and instead defers such decisions, quite 
appropriately, to the political branches.” Id. at 1669. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Other cases may arise with allegations of serious 
violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the [Torture 
Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”)] nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those 
disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may 
require some further elaboration and explanation.” (emphasis added)); id. (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“This formulation obviously leaves much unanswered . . . .”); id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring) (The 
Court “leaves for another day the determination of just when the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’” (quoting id. at 1666)); Sarah H. Cleveland, The Kiobel 
Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 8, 20 (2013) (“Returning now to that 
final paragraph of the majority opinion, we again ask what that test requires.”); David H. Moore, 
Kiobel and the New Battle Over Congressional Intent, in Agora: Reflections on Kiobel e-9, e-10 
(Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law ed., 2014) (“It will take time to flesh out what it means to ‘touch and concern 
the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.’”); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the 
Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk for a Short Drink, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 841, 842 (2013) (stating 
Kiobel “gives precious little guidance to the lower courts as they struggle to determine which 
allegations will overcome the new presumption and which will not”). 
 9. One commentator has observed that this uncertainty “will likely result in far fewer [ATS] 
cases being pursued in U.S. federal courts.” Andrew Sanger, Corporations and Transnational 
Litigation: Comparing Kiobel with the Jurisprudence of English Courts, in Agora: Reflections on 
Kiobel, supra note 8, at e-23, e-24. 
 10. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 11. Id. 
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majority opinion, suggestions from Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion 
that expressly contemplate international jurisdictional norms, and 
international jurisdictional norms more broadly—are: 
1. the location of the alleged law of nations violation; 
2. the location of other alleged relevant conduct; 
3. the nationality of the defendant; 
4. the demands of international comity; 
5. the likelihood that denial of subject matter jurisdiction could 
reasonably result in the United States harboring a human rights 
violator; and 
6. any other American national interest that supports the 
recognition of ATS subject matter jurisdiction. 
This Article seeks to provide a cogent and practical test to determine 
when the ATS applies to extraterritorial conduct. 
The ATS is, at least operatively, a human rights statute.12 Whether 
one deems its proper application domestic, extraterritorial, or both, it is 
undeniable that, at its drafting, Congress had “‘foreign matters’ in 
mind.”13 Those matters concerned, in part, violations of customary 
international law, that body of law recognized today as a source for 
international human rights standards.14 Congress has at no time acted to 
limit or annul the statute.15 While, in Kiobel, the Court delimited the 
activity that the statute reaches, it did nothing to alter the extant 
understanding of the statute’s purpose: “to provide compensation for 
those injured by today’s pirates.”16 What remains is the only statute of its 
kind in the country (and, indeed, the world) because it has the potential 
to provide an “alien” with a civil remedy from a U.S. court based upon a 
variety of customary international law violations committed by a foreign 
 
 12. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 843 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (observing that the ATS 
is a “statute that provides jurisdiction in United States courts for violations of international human rights 
norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory”) (citation omitted); see also Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 
727 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the ATS is “a statute, passed in 1789, that was rediscovered 
and revitalized by the courts in recent decades to permit aliens to sue for alleged serious violations of 
human rights occurring abroad”); Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme 
Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 601, 601 (2013) (noting that “the ATS . . . has 
become the main engine for transnational human rights litigation in the United States”). 
 13. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring). It seems unquestionable that this is the case 
given the impulse behind Congress’s enactment of the statute—concern about providing legal redress 
to foreigners harmed in the United States and concomitant concern about foreign policy implications 
in the event of congressional inaction. See id. at 1666. 
 14. See William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 
120 Harv. L. Rev. F. 19, 22 (2007) (recognizing that over time “new rules of customary international 
law emerged in areas like human rights”). 
 15. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Congress . . . has not sought to limit the 
statute’s jurisdictional or substantive reach.”). 
 16. Id. at 1673 (stating that the ATS’s “basic purpose” is to “compensat[e] those who have 
suffered harm at the hands of, for example, torturers or other modern pirates”). 
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national and occurring in the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.17  
This Article proposes that courts give full force to the statute’s 
terms as permitted by Kiobel, and not reactively assume even that a 
“foreign-cubed” case (a case with solely foreign plaintiffs and defendants 
and injury in a foreign country) cannot itself have sufficient U.S. features 
to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.18 Such an 
approach would be consistent with international jurisdictional norms, 
which Justice Breyer, at least, professed a desire to uphold. International 
jurisdictional norms recognize the propriety of courts exercising 
prescriptive jurisdiction,19 subject to reasonableness,20 in a variety of 
 
 17. Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law, Foreign Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2013, at 16, 16 
(“The ATS offers victims of abuse a rare tool in their fight for justice; the United States remains the 
only country in the world to entertain such lawsuits.”); see also Caroline Kaeb & David Scheffer, The 
Paradox of Kiobel in Europe, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 852, 854–55 (2013) (discussing the similarities and 
differences between the ATS and relevant European law, including the Brussels I Regulation, which 
allows for the bringing of a tort suit by a non-national against European Union (“EU”) companies, 
provided that the events that gave rise to the tort occurred on EU soil). While somewhat similar to the 
ATS, the TVPA, the companion statute to the ATS, provides a cause of action for an individual 
against an individual acting “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 
nation,” only for extrajudicial killing and torture. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2014). The ATS has broader 
application. See infra pp. 478–79. The claim brought pursuant to the ATS, however, must satisfy Sosa’s 
requirement that the relevant customary international law be specific and universally respected. Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725, 732 (2004). 
 18. See Jonathan Hafetz, Human Rights Litigation and the National Interest: Kiobel’s 
Application of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 Md. J. Int’l 
L. 107, 108 (2013) (“ATS litigation can promote U.S. interests even in ‘foreign-cubed cases,’ where 
both parties are foreign nationals and the alleged wrongful conduct takes place abroad.”); David L. 
Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 241, 244 (2013) 
(“[T]he universality principle authorizes states to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially in cases like 
Kiobel. Therefore, insofar as the Supreme Court wants to preclude application of the ATS to foreign-
cubed cases, it cannot legitimately invoke an international law rationale to justify that outcome.”); see 
also Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for Human Rights 
Violations, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 1, 23 (2013) (“Foreign-cubed cases against corporations that fit the 
Kiobel mold are barred, but the Court’s analysis . . . suggest[s] that foreign-cubed actions against 
individual human beings—as in Filártiga [v. Pena-Irala] and [In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights 
Litigation]—survive. . . . [T]hey are after all safe haven cases, in which the defendant commits abuses 
abroad and then comes to the United States and remains.”). But see Vivian Grosswald Curran & 
David Sloss, Reviving Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 858, 858 (2013) 
(“[T]he Court’s decision apparently sounds the death knell for ‘foreign-cubed’ human rights claims 
under the ATS—that is, cases in which foreign defendants committed human rights abuses against 
foreign plaintiffs in foreign countries.”); Justine Nolan et al., Beyond Kiobel: Alternative Remedies 
for Sustained Human Rights Protection, in Agora: Reflections on Kiobel, supra note 8, at e-48, e-49 
(“Absent affirmative support by the U.S. government, or a clearer expression of legislative intent by 
the U.S. Congress, most U.S. courts are likely to be reluctant to provide a judicial remedy in foreign-
cubed cases.”); John F. Savarese & George T. Conway III, The Impact of Kiobel Curtailing the 
Extraterritorial Scope of the Alien Tort Statute, Wall St. Law., July 2013, at 3 (“In its recent decision 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., . . . the Supreme Court put an abrupt and categorical end to 
foreign-cubed ATS litigation . . . .”). 
 19. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 (1987). 
 20. Id. § 403. 
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circumstances, including when: conduct occurs in a State’s territory,21 
“the status of persons, or interests in things” in a State’s territory are at 
issue,22 conduct occurs outside a State’s territory and “has or is intended 
to have substantial effect within [the State’s] territory,”23 matters 
concerning a State’s nationals (both outside and inside the State’s 
territory) are at issue,24 and conduct occurs outside the State’s territory 
by a foreign national but “is directed against the security of the [S]tate or 
against a limited class of other [S]tate interests.”25 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Kiobel plaintiffs to 
answer, at least initially, the single question of corporate liability under 
the ATS.26 That the Court decided not to expressly answer the question 
when it granted certiorari to do precisely that,27 but implied the existence 
of corporate liability, suggests that the Court tacitly provided its 
answer.28 This, of course, is good news for those concerned about 
allegations of corporate human rights abuses across the globe and who 
look to the ATS as a means to sue corporate tortfeasors. Given the 
Court’s implicit recognition of corporate liability under the ATS (or at 
least its choice not to state that there is no such liability), this Article 
assumes that such liability exists and bases its arguments on corporate (as 
opposed to individual) conduct.29 
 
 21. Id. § 402(1)(a). 
 22. Id. § 402(1)(b). 
 23. Id. § 402(1)(c). 
 24. Id. § 402(2). 
 25. Id. § 402(3). 
 26. After oral argument on this question, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of ordering 
additional briefing and reargument by the parties on the issue of the extraterritorial application of the 
ATS. The Court ultimately rendered its decision solely on this latter question. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). 
 27. Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 
2013) (noting that “the majority opinion did not address the issue of corporate liability under the 
ATS”) (citation omitted). 
 28. The Court suggested that some corporate behavior or status is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (opining that 
“[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere 
corporate presence suffices”) (emphasis added); see Doe v. Nestle, 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(finding, post-Kiobel, that “corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort 
Statute”); Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 844 (noting that the Court’s silence on the issue of corporate 
liability, after extensive briefing on the subject, suggests that “Kiobel offers no authority for any broad 
rethinking of ATS litigation against corporate defendants in general”; and recognizing that “the 
majority’s specification that ‘mere corporate presence is not enough’ would be superfluous if 
corporations were, in principle, immune from ATS liability”); Wuerth, supra note 12, at 609 
(observing that “[t]he Court did not directly address the question on which it originally granted 
certiorari—corporate liability under the ATS—but the opinions arguably assume the validity of ATS 
suits against corporations”); see also Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s 
Unexpected Legacy, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 829, 829 (assuming the application of the ATS, post-Kiobel, to 
American corporations and far less so foreign corporations, and finding that “American corporations 
are simply far more likely to satisfy [the “touch and concern” test] than foreign corporations”). 
 29. This Author believes, however, that the proposed test applies equally to individuals. 
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It is important to see Kiobel, especially inclusive of the corporate 
liability question, against the backdrop of events that are happening in 
the business and human rights communities globally. In 2005, U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan tapped Harvard Law Professor John 
Ruggie to research the relationship between business and human rights 
abuse.30 Pursuant to his appointment as Special Representative of the 
Secretary General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, Professor Ruggie issued the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations’ “Respect, Protect and Remedy Framework” (Guiding 
Principles).31 Those principles, presented within three “pillars,” speak to 
the responsibilities of states and corporations. The pillars are: (1) The 
State Duty to Protect Human Rights; (2) The Corporate Responsibility 
to Respect Human Rights; and (3) Access to Remedy.32 The Guiding 
Principles have received widespread commendation and acceptance by 
stakeholders, including national governments, civil society, and 
businesses themselves.33 It is the third pillar—Access to Remedy—that 
the ATS, even after Kiobel, has the capacity to vindicate.34 
 
 30. See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United 
States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business 
Enterprises, U.N. Press Release SG/A/934 (July 28, 2005). Additionally, in 2011, the United Nations 
Human Rights Council created an entity entitled the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Working Group). See Human 
Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, 17th Sess., July 6, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011). The Working Group 
consists of five international human rights experts and is charged with, among other tasks, ensuring the 
widespread distribution and implementation of the Guiding Principles. Working Group on the Issues 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Hum. Rts., 
Office of the High Commissioner for Hum. Rts., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/ 
Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 31. See generally Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) (presenting and discussing all thirty-one principles). 
For further reading, see John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and 
Human Rights (2013) and Jena Martin Amerson, “The End of the Beginning?”: A Comprehensive 
Look at the U.N.’s Business and Human Rights Agenda from a Bystander Perspective, 17 Fordham J. 
Corp. & Fin. L. 871 (2012). 
 32. U.N. Human Rights Council, Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, iii, 
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011). 
 33. The interest in the Guiding Principles is so substantial that at the second U.N. Forum on 
Business and Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland, in December 2013, there were approximately 
1,500 participants from over 100 countries, and all societal sectors—government, civil society, and 
business. See 2013 United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/2013ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see also State National Action Plans, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) 
(providing links to several “State National Action Plans” related to business and human rights). Many 
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Professor Ruggie also issued survey results on “the scope and 
patterns of alleged . . . human rights abuses.”35 These results are key, 
given the difficulty in approximating the extent and nature of the 
perceived problem of corporate human rights abuse.36 In his report, he 
 
stakeholders have also accepted “The Ten Principles,” regarding business and human rights, promulgated 
by the U.N. Global Compact, an organization supported by the U.N. General Assembly. See General 
Assembly Resolutions, U.N. Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/ 
Government_Support/general_assembly_resolutions.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); The Ten Principles, 
U.N. Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 34. Some commentators, however, find the practical application of the Guiding Principles 
unclear. See Nolan, supra note 18, at e-50 (“While the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights both affirm that companies have a responsibility to respect rights and call on 
governments and companies to develop meaningful remedies when rights are violated, a lack of clarity 
or consensus still exists about what these concepts mean in practice.”). 
 35. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey 
of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May 23, 2008) (addendum to Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Promotion and 
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the 
Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008)) [hereinafter Ruggie Addendum]. 
 36. The problem of corporate human rights abuses, however, is thought to be so great that, 
beyond the work of the U.N., governmental, nongovernmental, and commercial entities have devoted 
energy, resources, and imagination to its understanding and prevention. For example, the U.S. 
government has instituted new corporate reporting requirements to address concerns about the 
impacts that businesses have on human rights. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue a rule mandating that 
companies whose products require the use of certain minerals in their manufacture—including 
tantalum, tin, gold, and tungsten—publicly disclose whether they procured these minerals from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) or one of several adjoining countries. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–2218 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. (2014)). Ostensibly, the purpose of the rule is to prevent the 
funding of armed conflict and/or human rights abuses in the DRC and adjoining countries by limiting 
the purchase of minerals from entities that might use the payments to fund conflict and/or human 
rights atrocities. The thought seems to be that by shining a light on the procurement of these so-called 
“conflict minerals,” companies will purchase fewer of them. See 156 Cong. Rec. S3817 (daily ed. 
May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd). But see Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: 
Why Naming and Shaming Corporations Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance 
Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 Regent U. L. Rev. 351 (2013) (discussing possible 
unintended consequences of the conflict minerals rule). The rule went into effect on January 1, 2013, 
and companies were set to issue the first of such reports on May 31, 2014. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b 
(2014). There are also countless nongovernmental organizations devoted to the issue of business and 
human rights. See, e.g., Business and Human Rights, Amnesty Int’l, http://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
business-and-human-rights (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Business and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/topic/business (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Demand Corporate Accountability, Amazon 
Watch, http://amazonwatch.org/work/corporate-accountability (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Current Cases, 
Ctr. for Const. Rts., http://ccrjustice.org/current-cases (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Cases, Ctr. for Just. & 
Accountability, http://cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=5 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Corporate 
Accountability, EarthRights Int’l, http://www.earthrights.org/legal/corporate-accountability (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015); Our Work, Int’l Lab. Rts. F., http://www.laborrights.org/our-work (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015); What We Do, Int’l Rts. Advocs., http://www.iradvocates.org/what-we-do (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015); Challenging Corporations, Rainforest Action Network, http://ran.org/challenging-
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reviewed 320 cases (reported over a roughly three-year period) of 
alleged corporate human rights abuses and noted that these allegations 
emerged from “all industry sectors” and spanned the globe.37 According 
to his review, these cases “connected alleged abuses to over 250 firms, 
ranging from small suppliers to Fortune Global 500 companies, to State-
owned enterprises and their subsidiaries.”38 Professor Ruggie observed 
that corporations were alleged to be “directly” responsible for 
approximately sixty percent of the human rights abuses39—meaning that 
the corporation’s “own actions or omissions were alleged to cause the 
abuse”40 with “no degree or a very minimal degree of separation 
between company actions and alleged abuses.”41 Additionally, he 
observed that corporations were alleged to be “indirectly”42 responsible for 
approximately forty percent of the abuses,43 meaning that the 
corporation “contribute[d] to or benefit[ted] from the abuses of third 
parties.”44 Professor Ruggie noted that this indirect involvement can take 
multiple forms, including “[s]tate clearing of land for corporate use that 
 
corporations (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). Further, numerous multinational corporations have themselves 
instituted corporate social responsibility programs to prevent human rights abuses. These programs take 
many forms, including but not limited to, creating codes of conduct with a specific focus on human rights, 
providing employee human rights awareness training, undertaking social impact assessments, and creating 
supplier guidelines. See Shell Code of Conduct, Shell Global, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/who-
we-are/our-values/code-of-conduct.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Respecting Human Rights, ExxonMobil, 
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/community_rights_respect.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Social 
Impact Assessments, Occidental Petroleum Corp., http://www.oxy.com/sr/HumanRights/Pages/ 
SocialImpactAssessments.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Supplier Guiding Principles, Coca-Cola Co., 
http://www.coca-colacompany.com/our-company/supplier-guiding-principles (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); 
Guidelines, Daimler AG, http://www.daimler.com/company/corporate-governance/guidelines (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015); Good Business, Hershey Co., http://www.thehersheycompany.com/social-responsibility/ 
sharedgoodness/goodbusiness (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see also Company Policy Statements on Human 
Rights, Bus. & Hum. Rts. Res. Ctr., http://business-humanrights.org/en/company-policy-statements-on-
human-rights (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (providing links to hundreds of corporate policy statements that 
expressly mention “human rights”). 
 37. Ruggie Addendum, supra note 35, at 2, 9 (including industry sectors such as, “extractive; 
financial services; food and beverage; heavy manufacturing, infrastructure and utilities; information 
technology, electronics and telecommunications; pharmaceutical and chemical; retail and consumer 
products; and a residual category (other)”). To determine the rights to be protected, Professor Ruggie 
stated that he consulted the following conventions: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, and the International Labor Organization Conventions. Id. at 2. 
 38. Id. at 9. 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Most ATS cases concern indirect corporate involvement in human rights abuses. See 
Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 Hastings L.J. 61, 63 (2008) 
(“The problem of accomplice liability most often arises in ATS cases brought against corporations for 
their alleged complicity in international law violations perpetrated by foreign governments, because 
corporations rarely engage in conduct such as torture, rape, and summary execution directly.”). 
 43. Ruggie Addendum, supra note 35, at 4. 
 44. Id. 
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violates indigenous rights in the process,”45 “corporate finance of 
projects with records of abuse,”46 and purchasing supplies from a human 
rights abuser.47 
The review divided the allegations into instances where labor rights 
were impacted and those where nonlabor rights were impacted.48 Of the 
former, the allegations included the failure to respect the “abolition of 
slavery and forced labor” and the “abolition of child labor.”49 Of the 
latter, the allegations included the failure to respect the “right to life, 
liberty and the security of the person” and “freedom from torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”50 The vast majority of these 
allegations concerned events that occurred outside of the United States.51 
These allegations are the “stuff” of ATS claims. Indeed, plaintiffs 
likely began to avail themselves of the ATS in the 1990s, rather than 
using perhaps the more obvious alternative, state tort law, because: (1) 
they could secure subject matter jurisdiction for “foreign-cubed” cases;52 
(2) before Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,53 and to some degree after, they 
could use the ATS to provide both subject matter jurisdiction and a 
cause of action;54 (3) they could benefit from the statute’s perceived ten-
 
 45. Id. at 11. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 12–13. 
 49. Id. at 2. 
 50. Id. at 3. 
 51. Id. at 9–10; see also Keitner, supra note 42, at 74 n.57 (“[T]he vast majority of ATS cases 
involve conduct that took place overseas.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (making no issue of the foreign-
cubedness of the ATS claim, which involved Mexican parties and an alleged tort that occurred in 
Mexico); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding ATS 
jurisdiction where the parties were Philippines citizens and the alleged tort occurred in that country); 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding ATS jurisdiction where the parties were 
Paraguayan citizens and the alleged tort occurred in that country). 
 53. The significance of Sosa is manifold: (1) it clarified that the ATS is solely a jurisdictional 
statute and does not provide a cause of action, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–13, 724; (2) at the same time, it 
acknowledged that the causes of action that the ATS should recognize are judge-made, for example, 
federal common law, id. at 724, 729; (3) it stated that this federal common law must derive from 
customary international law, id. at 729–30; and (4) it provided a framework for courts to use when 
determining the customary international law that they should recognize at common law, id. at 731–32. 
To wit, as noted above, it states that courts should recognize customary international law that is 
specific and universally respected. Id. at 725, 732. 
 54. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1262 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In Sosa, the Supreme 
Court confirmed the ATS is not only a jurisdictional statute; the ATS also empowers federal courts to 
entertain ‘a very limited category’ of claims” (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712) (citing Aldana v. Del 
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005))), abrogated on other grounds 
by Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); Anton Metlitsky, The Alien Tort 
Statute, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of Federal-Common-Law Causes of Action, 52 Colum. 
J. Transnat’l L. 53, 54 (2013) (“[T]he lower courts generally held the view that the ATS provided 
private plaintiffs a right of action to enforce certain norms of international law that were incorporated 
into federal common law.”). 
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year limitation period;55 and (4) they could take advantage of the social 
pressure against the defendant attendant with a claim of a human rights 
violation.56 While today, post-Kiobel, it is clear that the ATS is 
unavailable for a foreign-cubed case unless the claim touches and 
concerns the United States and does not provide a cause of action,57 the 
statute remains a potentially useful tool for plaintiffs because of the 
assumed lengthy statute of limitations and the social pressure applied to 
an ATS defendant. Additionally, the alternative to seeking jurisdiction 
under the statute—state common law—carries with it inherent 
obstacles.58 Were plaintiffs forced to forsake ATS claims59 for state 
 
 55.  See Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 778 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “[u]nder the TVPA 
and the ATCA, Plaintiffs have ten years from the date the cause of action arose to bring suit for 
torture, extrajudicial killing and other torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States” (citations omitted)); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 06-cv-3869, 2009 WL 4663865, 
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009) (citing Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002)) 
(concluding that the statute of limitations for the ATS is ten years); Arce v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 1340, 
1345–46 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, 239 F.R.D. 342, 346 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(same); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118–19 (D.D.C. 2003) (same); Manliguez 
v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). 
 56. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 Geo. L.J. 709, 725 (2012) (“[I]t seems that the real value of an ATS case 
is that it transforms a tort case into a human-rights case.”); Leval, supra note 17, at 16 (“At the very 
least, keeping courts open to civil suits about human rights can bring solace and compensation to 
victims. More important, these suits draw global attention to atrocities, and in so doing perhaps deter 
would-be abusers.”); Robert McCorquodale, Waving Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United 
States, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 846, 850–51 (2013) (recognizing that many cases outside the United States 
do not style human rights abuse claims as such, but rather as a claim of negligence or breach of 
contract and that this change in nomenclature “diminishes the potential significance of the clear 
statement in the Guiding Principles that corporations (and not just states) may be liable for violating 
human rights”). 
 57. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (noting that “all the 
relevant conduct took place outside the United States” but also that the presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of the ATS can be displaced if the ATS claim touches and concerns the 
United States “with sufficient force to displace the presumption”). Id. at 1663 (“The statute provides 
district courts with jurisdiction to hear certain claims, but does not expressly provide any causes of action.”). 
 58. It is true, though, that if plaintiffs bring their claims under state law, they will not be burdened 
with: (1) whether a corporation can be sued under the statute; (2) whether the facts of the case 
sufficiently touch and concern the United States as to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality; (3) whether the alleged tort violates the law of nations; or (4) whether the alleged 
law of nations violation satisfies Sosa. Professor Hoffman is surely correct when he writes that “it is 
clear that any further narrowing of the extraterritorial scope of the ATS after Kiobel will shift 
litigation to state courts or to federal courts based on diversity or other bases of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.” Paul L. Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: First Impressions, 52 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 28, 51 (2013). Dean Austen Parrish, however, observes the “folly” of filing would-be 
ATS actions in state court. See Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism and the Retreat from 
Extraterritoriality, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 208, 240 (2013) (“[E]mploying a state law strategy is unlikely to 
meaningfully advance human rights. These cases face tremendous hurdles to success. While the 
presumption against extraterritoriality may not apply, courts will rightly be reluctant to adjudicate 
foreign claims for abuses occurring abroad to which the state has no interest.”). 
 59. See Peter Henner, When Is a Corporation a Person? When It Wants To Be. Will Kiobel End 
Alien Tort Statute Litigation?, 12 Wyo. L. Rev. 303, 304 (2012) (“The claims in Kiobel are typical of 
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common law claims,60 they would likely lose the liberal ten-year statute 
of limitation (most probably for something far shorter61) and any benefit 
they might have accrued as a result of framing their claim as a human 
rights violation. Plaintiffs might also subject themselves to powerful 
preemption arguments62 and compelling forum non conveniens motions.63 
Given these concerns and the allegations that plaintiffs typically present,64 
it is important to elucidate the continued vitality of the ATS. This Article 
endeavors to do that by divining balancing factors from Kiobel’s touch 
and concern test.65 
Part I analyzes several decisions rendered post-Kiobel, focusing on 
the way that the courts interpreted, if at all, the Supreme Court’s touch 
and concern language. Part II suggests a multifactor balancing test 
derived from intimations in the Kiobel majority opinion; stated preferences 
by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion, premised, in part, on 
international jurisdictional norms; and international jurisdictional norms 
broadly, to determine when a defendant’s conduct has touched and 
concerned the United States with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Part III demonstrates how the 
proposed test interacts with Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 
in which the Supreme Court opined that the presumption against 
 
many ATS cases where plaintiffs allege that a multinational corporation, operating in a country 
outside of the United States, has aided and abetted a repressive government in brutally suppressing 
opposition to government policy.”); David He, Note, Beyond Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach 
of U.S. Laws After Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 148, 190–91 (2013) (citations 
omitted) (“The typical ATS claims brought against individuals often involve instances of torture, 
arbitrary and prolonged arrests, murders and executions, and genocide and other crimes against 
humanity.”).  
 60. Svetlana Meyerzon Nagiel, Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim Compensation: How 
States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights Claims, 46 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 133, 155–59 (2007) 
(observing that some plaintiffs bring human rights claims pursuant to state statute and the state 
common law, including breach of contract, negligence, negligence per se, aiding and abetting and 
vicarious liability). 
 61. See 50 State Statutory Surveys: Civil Laws: Civil Procedure: Civil Statutes of 
Limitation, 0020 Surveys 1 (West 2007). 
 62. See Childress, supra note 56, at 749–50. 
 63. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient 
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 Va. J. Int’l L. 157 (2012). 
 64. See He, supra note 59, at 190–91. 
 65. Indeed, such a test might make ATS litigation more fruitful for plaintiffs than it has been to 
date, as it would provide the beginnings of a framework for litigating the cases. See Moore, supra note 
8, at e-18 (noting that “[h]uman rights litigation under the ATS has been largely symbolic and has 
rarely led to liability”); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s 
Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 169, 175 (2004) (observing that many 
ATS cases have failed pursuant to sovereign immunity, political question, and statute of limitation and 
sufficiency of claim challenges); Samuel Moyn, Why the Court Was Right About the Alien Tort 
Statute, Foreign Aff. (May 2, 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139359/samuel-moyn/why-
the-court-was-right-about-the-alien-tort-statute (recognizing that “[t]he ATS never proved that useful 
in advancing the cause of global human rights”). 
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extraterritoriality applies to federal statutes unless the statute clearly 
indicates otherwise and that those statutes only contemplate the conduct 
or the relationship that is the focus of the statute and not ancillary 
activity.66 The Article concludes by underscoring the opportunity created 
by Kiobel to craft a balancing test that brings clarity to the kinds of 
claims that the ATS can reach. 
I.  Post-KIOBEL Cases 
At this writing, a few dozen federal courts have spoken 
substantively to the extraterritorial reach of the ATS since Kiobel.67 
These courts fall roughly into one of the following camps: those that read 
Kiobel to require that the law of nations violation occur in the United 
States in order to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality 
(These courts view the law of nations violation as the direct—and, 
indeed, ultimate—injury and do not hold that a predicate act giving rise 
to the direct injury could itself constitute a law of nations violation.); 
those that read the case to require that only relevant conduct (as 
distinguished from the law of nations violation) occur in the United 
States in order to displace the presumption; those that read the case to 
allow U.S. citizenship (or residency) to displace the presumption; those 
that read the case to disallow U.S. citizenship to displace the 
 
 66. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 67. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. (Al Shimari II), 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 
2014); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Chowdhury v. Worldtel 
Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2014); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Muntslag v. D’ieteren, S.A., No. 12-cv-07038 (TPG), 2013 WL 2150686 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013); Mwani 
v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Salvation Army, No. 13-cv-289-WS, 
2013 WL 2432947 (N.D. Fla. June 3, 2013); Fotso v. Rep. of Cameroon, No. 12CV1415-TC, 2013 WL 
3006338 (D. Ore. June 11, 2013); Mwangi v. Bush, No. 12-373-KKC, 2013 WL 3155018 (E.D. Ky. 
June 18, 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc. (Al Shimari I), 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va. 2013); 
Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. 
Obama, No. 13-cv-49-MW/GRJ, 2013 WL 3797287 (N.D. Fla. July 19, 2013); Giraldo v. Drummond 
Co., No. 09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013); Hua Chen v. Honghui Shi, 
No. 09Civ8920(RJS), 2013 WL 3963735 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Fed. Republic 
of Nigeria, No. 13-cv-172-RS-GRJ, 2013 WL 3991961 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2013); Ahmed v. Comm’r for 
Educ. Lagos State, No. 13-cv-00050-MP-GRJ, 2013 WL 4001194 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2013); Ahmed-Al-
Khalifa v. Al-Assad, No. 13-cv-48-RV-GRJ, 2013 WL 4401831 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2013); Sexual 
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 10-cv-00342, 
2013 WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 185 (D.D.C. 2013); Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 23, 2013); Muntslag v. Beerens, No. 12-cv-07168(TPG), 2013 WL 4519669 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 
2013); Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794(KMW), 2013 WL 4564646 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013); 
Chen Gang v. Zhao Zhizhen, No. 04CV1146RNC, 2013 WL 5313411 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2013); Dacer 
v. Estrada, No. C 10-04165 WHA, 2013 WL 5978101 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013); In re S. Afr. Apartheid 
Litig., Nos. 02MDL1499(SAS), 02Civ4712(SAS), Civ6218(SAS), Civ1024(SAS), 03Civ4524(SAS), 2013 
WL 6813877 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013). 
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presumption; and those that read the case to acknowledge that only 
Congress can displace a statute’s presumption against extraterritoriality.  
 The disparate conclusions of these courts show the need for a 
coherent test to determine when the presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of a statute should be displaced. Indeed, the 
district court in Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc. (Al Shimari I) 
opined that “it is unclear to the Court how to apply the ‘touch and 
concern’ inquiry to a purely jurisdictional statute such as the ATS.”68 
Below is a discussion of a few post-Kiobel cases that are remarkable for 
their interpretation, or lack thereof, of the touch and concern test. 
As of this writing, three circuit courts have interpreted Kiobel 
through considered written opinions69—the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit,70 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,71 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.72 In three of the 
four cases decided, the courts dismissed the ATS claims on the ground 
that no relevant conduct occurred in the United States. This Article 
begins with a discussion of Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, 
Inc., which jars in its failure to respond, even in small part, to the 
Supreme Court’s implied call for courts to consider whether a plaintiff’s 
ATS allegations touch and concern the United States. 
In Cardona, the plaintiffs alleged that Chiquita, a U.S.-based banana 
producer, funded Colombian terrorists who violated the law of nations.73 
They further alleged that “Chiquita participated in a campaign of torture 
and murder in Colombia by reviewing, approving, and concealing a 
scheme of payments and weapons shipments to Colombian terrorist 
organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the 
United States.”74 
Without attempting to define “relevant conduct,” opine on the 
contours of the “touch and concern” test, or even discuss the plaintiffs’ 
allegations of Chiquita’s domestic conduct, the court dismissed the case, 
stating: “All the relevant conduct in our case took place outside the 
 
 68. Al Shimari I, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (emphasis added). By this, the court seemed to make two 
valid points: (1) there is no extant touch and concern test; and (2) to apply such a test, which 
necessarily speaks to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim, seems awkward, if not inappropriate, for a 
jurisdictional analysis. 
 69. In light of Kiobel, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed 
the dismissal of Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, a case brought by former and current residents of Papua New 
Guinea against a British corporation, for crimes against humanity, amongst other atrocities, all 
occurring in Papua New Guinea. 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 70. Balintulo, 727 F.3d 174; Chowdhury, 746 F.3d 42. 
 71. Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d 516. 
 72. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 73. Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. 
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United States.”75 The court seemed to consider only direct harm—that 
which the plaintiffs alleged to have occurred in Colombia—to be the 
kind of harm cognizable by the ATS. It stated that “[t]here is no 
allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other 
act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched or concerned the 
territory of the United States with any force.”76 Had the court heeded 
Kiobel’s call it would have considered the plaintiffs’ numerous 
allegations of Chiquita’s domestic activity in furtherance of a foreign 
result and determined whether this activity constituted relevant conduct. 
It would have then, based on these allegations, determined whether the 
plaintiffs’ ATS claim touched and concerned the United States with the 
requisite force to displace the presumption and provided the reasons 
therefore. 
Additionally, the court never attributed any significance to the fact 
that Chiquita is a U.S.-based corporation. This is due, perhaps, to the 
court’s contention that there is no evidence that Congress intended U.S. 
nationality to displace the presumption.77 However the Supreme Court 
arguably permitted this very consideration by way of the touch and 
concern test. In addition, the court never contemplated the related 
possibility of the United States providing safe harbor to an alleged aider 
and abettor of torture.78 This may be a result of the court’s apparent view 
that torture is not a customary international law violation—unless 
perhaps committed by a government— so neither would be its aiding and 
abetting,79 and the court’s strict and sole allegiance to the question of the 
location of the direct harm as dispositive of ATS jurisdiction.80 These 
omissions, though, ignore what it likely means for a claim to touch and 
concern the United States. 
Somewhat similarly, in Balintulo v. Daimler AG, a case brought by 
South Africans, involving allegations against numerous multinational 
 
 75. Id. at 1189 (majority opinion). 
 76. Id. at 1191. Additionally, the court suggested that torture is not a law of nations violation and 
therefore, may not be cognizable under the ATS. Id. at 1190 (“It is not nearly so clear, as our 
dissenting colleague believes, that acts described as ‘torture’ come within the jurisdiction created by 
the statute over ‘a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.’”). This determination ignores powerful evidence to the contrary. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the torture-based ATS 
claims in Filartiga and In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation and stating that “in Sosa we referred to 
both cases with approval, suggesting that the ATS allowed a claim for relief in such circumstances”). 
 77. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1190. 
 80. See id. at 1189–90 (“Any tort here, whether styled as torture or under some other theory, 
occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The ATS contains nothing to rebut 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1191 (“There is no allegation 
that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS 
touched or concerned the territory of the United States with any force.”). 
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corporations for aiding and abetting torture and murder in South Africa 
during its apartheid era, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
complaint did not allege that any relevant conduct that formed the basis 
of their ATS claim occurred in the United States, as required by 
Kiobel.81 Further, the court rejected plaintiffs’ notion (borrowed, the 
court suggested, from Justice Breyer),82 that corporate citizenship in the 
United States is sufficient to ground an ATS claim.83 
The court may have, however, overread Kiobel by focusing solely 
on relevant conduct. While in Kiobel the Supreme Court stated that 
none of the relevant conduct occurred in the United States, it did not 
state that only relevant conduct need be considered to determine 
whether an ATS claim sufficiently touches and concerns the United 
States. Indeed, the Court did not identify in any way the conduct, status, 
or relationship that can touch and concern the United States with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
The Court only suggested that relevant conduct must occur in the United 
States, by noting that such conduct was absent in the case before it, and 
that “mere corporate presence” is insufficient to displace the 
presumption.84 If the Court, though, was leaving it to the lower courts to 
determine the meaning of “touch and concern,” the Second Circuit, like 
the Eleventh Circuit, has spoken: it does not mean corporate citizenship. 
What seemed dispositive for the court was the allegation that the 
relevant conduct occurred in a sovereign other than the United States. 
Indeed, the court stated that lower courts are bound by the rule that the 
ATS does not apply if the relevant conduct occurs outside of the United 
States and “are without authority to ‘reinterpret’ the Court’s binding 
precedent in light of irrelevant factual distinctions, such as the citizenship 
of the defendants.”85 Such a conclusion, in part, rejects the opportunity 
to fully engage the question of the ATS’s reach, inclusive of determining 
why corporate citizenship is insufficient to displace the presumption, if 
that is indeed the view of the court. 
Moreover, and perhaps more concerning, is the Second Circuit’s 
assertion that for an ATS claim to lie, the law of nations violation—not 
merely relevant conduct—must occur in the United States.86 This is the 
 
 81. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 188 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 82. Id. at 189. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). The mentioning of corporate 
“presence,” however, may suggest a willingness on the part of the Court to deem some variety of 
presence, perhaps even citizenship, sufficient to displace the presumption. See infra pp. 472–75, 479–80. 
 85. Balintulo, 727 F. 3d at 190 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 86. Sometimes the court seemed to equivocate on this point, see id. at 189–92, but reading the 
opinion as a whole, it appears that the court believes that the “violation of the law of nations” is the 
“relevant conduct” that must occur in the United States. See generally id.; see also Julian Ku, 
Goodbye ATS? U.S. Appeals Court Dismisses South African Apartheid ATS Case and Rejects 
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view of Justice Alito;87 it is not the stated view of the Supreme Court 
majority. But, as discussed above, in Kiobel, the Court never defined 
“relevant conduct,”88 just as it never defined “touch and concern.” There 
is room in this vacuum for a definition of touch and concern that includes 
relevant conduct, ranging from conduct that is material to a customary 
international law violation to the customary international law violation 
itself, given the significance placed on the location of all material conduct 
at international law.89 There is also room in this vacuum for a touch and 
concern test that includes corporate citizenship, given the significance 
placed on nationality at international law.90 
Likewise, in Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., a 
citizen of Bangladesh filed an action alleging torture, pursuant to the 
ATS, against another citizen of Bangladesh and a Bangladeshi 
corporation, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York. The district court found that the plaintiff had established 
jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS and the jury later found both the 
individual and the corporate defendant liable for torture.91 These 
proceedings occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in a decision issued after Kiobel, vacated 
the judgment, concluding that: (1) ATS liability could not lie against 
either defendant because all of the events at issue occurred in 
Bangladesh and the ATS does not apply to extraterritorial conduct; and 
 
Narrow Reading of Kiobel, Opinio Juris (Aug. 22, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/22/goodbye-
ats-u-s-appeals-court-dismisses-south-african-apartheid-ats-case-and-rejects-narrow-reading-of-kiobel 
(“If Balintulo is followed, the era of ATS lawsuits in the U.S. is coming to an end.”). 
 87. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). In his opinion, Justice Alito (joined by 
Justice Thomas) stated: “[A] putative ATS cause of action will fall within the scope of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the domestic conduct is 
sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and 
acceptance among civilized nations.” The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 
followed Justice Alito’s approach in Giraldo v. Drummond Co., a case brought by Colombian citizens, 
involving allegations of torture and murder, against Alabama-based Drummond Coal Co. and its 
affiliates. No. 09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013). The Drummond court 
stated that “the most logical and unstrained reading of Kiobel” requires the ATS to apply 
extraterritorially only “if the event on which the statute focuses [the law of nations violation] did not 
occur abroad.” Id. at *8. According to the court, this is “the seismic shift that Kiobel has caused.” Id. at 
*1 (emphasis added). The Kiobel majority opinion, however, simply does not go this far. See Kiobel, 133 
S. Ct. at 1669. That opinion does not require the domestic conduct to itself constitute the law of nations 
violation. 
 88. Certainly the Court never conflated “law of nations violation” and “relevant conduct,” as the 
Second Circuit seems to do. 
 89. The majority opinion in Kiobel credibly lends itself to a reading that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality can be overcome even if the law of nations violation occurs abroad, provided that 
the claim in some way touches and concerns the United States. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
 90. See infra pp. 473–76. 
 91. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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(2) in the Second Circuit, ATS liability cannot lie against a corporation.92 
The court did not apply a touch and concern test of any kind. Moreover, 
it did not consider any fact or factor that was even akin to a touch and 
concern analysis. The court simply employed Kiobel to the end of vacating 
the judgment on the ground that the events at issue occurred abroad. 
A coherent and nuanced touch and concern test would require 
courts to engage the possibility that circumstances exist to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Without the existence and 
application of such a test, there is no reason for a court to consider the 
location of all of the relevant conduct, the nationality of the defendant, 
or other worthy issues, such as whether international comity demands 
recognition of ATS jurisdiction (as opposed to the converse), whether 
there is a risk of the United States harboring a human rights violator if 
ATS jurisdiction is not recognized, and whether the conduct at issue 
undermines some other important American national interest.93 These 
latter considerations differ from considerations of the location of the 
relevant conduct and the defendant’s nationality, which align neatly with 
the international jurisdictional norms of territoriality and nationality. 
The latter considerations become especially important when a court, like 
that in Chowdhury, is presented with allegations that the United States is 
neither the location of the relevant conduct nor the country of citizenship 
of the defendants. 
By considerable contrast to Chiquita, Balintulo, and Chowdhury, in 
Al Shimari II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that Kiobel requires a “fact-based inquiry”94 to determine 
whether the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the 
ATS should be displaced. Pursuant to such an inquiry, the court 
determined that the plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently touched and concerned 
the United States as to displace the presumption. There, Iraqi citizens 
sued a U.S. government contractor, alleging that they had been tortured 
by the contractor’s employees while detained at the infamous Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq. The district court concluded that it had no “ATS 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because the acts giving rise to their tort 
claims occurred exclusively in Iraq, a foreign sovereign.”95 This holding, 
the court opined, was consistent with the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of the ATS.96 In crafting essentially a 
separation of powers argument, the district court further concluded that 
it possessed no institutional capacity to displace the presumption, 
 
 92. Indeed it was the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel, concluding that there was no corporate 
liability under the ATS, that the Supreme Court was originally disposed to review. See supra p. 447. 
 93. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also infra pp. 465–67, 482–83. 
 94. Al Shimari II, Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 95. Al Shimari I, 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858 (E.D. Va. 2013). 
 96. Id. 
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observing that the Supreme Court, in Kiobel, impliedly stated that 
Congress alone can determine when conduct sufficiently touches and 
concerns the United States to dislodge the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.97 Moreover, the court dismissed the idea that Kiobel 
even suggested that courts consider the facts of individual cases to determine 
whether the relevant conduct touches and concerns the United States, 
calling the plaintiffs’ contentions to the contrary “demonstrably flawed.”98 
In vacating the district court’s decision, the Fourth Circuit stated 
that “the clear implication of the [Supreme] Court’s ‘touch and concern’ 
language is that courts should not assume that the presumption 
categorically bars cases that manifest a close connection to United States 
territory.”99 Pursuant to this reading of Kiobel, the court considered the 
plaintiffs’ allegations, noting their U.S. features, including: the execution 
of the contract between the U.S. government and the government 
contractor in the United States; the contractor’s incorporation in the 
United States; the commission of torture by U.S. citizens; the occurrence of 
the torture “at a military facility operated by United States government 
personnel”100; the “tacit approval”101 of the torture, “attempt[] to ‘cover up’ 
the misconduct”102 and, at a minimum, “implicit[] . . . encourage[ment]” of 
the torture by “CACI’s managers in the United States.”103 The court also 
interpreted congressional intent to indicate a desire to provide judicial 
access to aliens and bring U.S. citizens who had committed torture 
outside of the United States to justice.104 The court thus considered a 
panoply of allegations, including those concerning CACI’s activity in the 
United States, to determine that the plaintiffs’ torture claims sufficiently 
touched and concerned the United States to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.105 
 
 97. Id. at 866 (“The Supreme Court makes clear that the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
rebuttable by legislative act, not judicial decision”). The court opined that “[n]owhere in the Kiobel 
decision does the Court explicitly state or even suggest that the facts of a case should or could, under 
certain circumstances, inform a court’s judgment about whether the presumption is sufficiently 
rebutted and thus displaced.” Id. at 867. The Supreme Court’s “touch and concern” language, 
however, seems to refer to the fact-finding of other courts as the means for determining whether a 
claim has a sufficient domestic connection. See infra Part II. 
 98. Al Shimari I, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867. 
 99. Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d at 528. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 531. 
 102. Id. at 529. 
 103. Id. at 531. 
 104. Id. 
 105. The court noted that when, for example, a case contains a claim alleging that the relevant 
contract was “executed by a United States corporation with the United States government . . . it is not 
sufficient merely to say that because the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch 
and concern United States territory.” Id. at 528. 
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Similarly, in Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively,106 a case brought 
by a Uganda-based organization against a U.S. citizen, alleging, amongst 
other things, crimes against humanity based upon the persecution of 
persons because of their sexual orientation and/or gender identity, the 
court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality was displaced 
because the defendant was a U.S. citizen and U.S. resident, and a 
substantial part of his alleged wrongful conduct occurred in the United 
States.107 Most critically, the court stated, “[t]he fact that the impact of 
Defendant’s conduct was felt in Uganda cannot deprive Plaintiff of a 
claim.”108 The court opined that the “[d]efendant’s alleged actions in 
planning and managing a campaign of repression in Uganda from the 
United States are analogous to a terrorist designing and manufacturing a 
bomb in this country, which he then mails to Uganda with the intent that 
it explode there.”109 Observing that public policy supports recognizing 
ATS claims where the defendant committed acts in the United States but 
the injury occurred abroad, the court opined that the law of nations 
requires that a country make its citizens answer to claims by 
foreigners.110 Further, the court asserted that the failure of courts to 
recognize these claims could result in the very foreign policy quagmire 
sought to be avoided by limiting the claims recognized by the ATS—fear 
of retaliation by other sovereigns.111 
By recognizing the legal significance of the defendant’s alleged 
conduct in the United States, the courts in Al Shimari II and Lively 
simultaneously, if tacitly, advanced two key tenets: (1) ATS jurisdiction 
can be premised on a claim of aiding and abetting a customary 
international law violation, even if the aiding and abetting occurs in the 
United States and the direct injury occurs abroad; and (2) aiding and 
abetting a customary international law violation is itself a customary 
international law violation.112 Additionally, the courts’ consideration of 
the defendants’ citizenship as a relevant factor when determining 
whether a claim touches and concerns the United States suggests that 
while “mere corporate presence” is not enough to satisfy the touch and 
 
 106. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 107. Id. at 310. 
 108. Id. at 321–22. 
 109. Id. at 322. 
 110. Id. at 323 (“If the court’s decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone 
the original wrongful act, under the law of nations the United States would become responsible for the 
failure of its courts and be answerable not to the injured alien but to his home state.” (quoting Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985))). 
 111. Id. at 322–23. 
 112. See Keitner, supra note 42, at 79 (observing that “aiding and abetting an international law 
violation itself violates international law”). See generally Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014); 
Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304; infra Part II.C. 
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concern test, corporate citizenship might be relevant to this 
determination.113 The courts, then, leapt into the space left by Kiobel and 
determined that the touch and concern test could be satisfied pursuant to 
multiple, if not singular, United States features.114 
Somewhat similarly, in Ahmed v. Magan,115 a case brought by one 
Somali citizen against another, alleging arbitrary detention, torture, and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the magistrate judge concluded 
that the plaintiff overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
even though this was a foreign-cubed case, because the defendant had 
become a U.S. resident.116 The magistrate reasoned that because the 
defendant was enjoying the “protections of U.S. law”117 he should also 
“be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.”118 This conclusion aligns 
with (although is not identical to) Justice Breyer’s contention that the 
presumption should be displaced if the defendant is “an American 
national.”119 The court, however, deemed the presumption displaced by 
an even looser relationship between the defendant and the United 
States.120 The district court accepted the magistrate’s Report and 
Recommendation and also began to answer the question of what satisfies 
Kiobel’s touch and concern test.121 
The above discussion shows that courts are plainly unclear about 
how to determine whether a claim touches and concerns the United 
States, let alone when it has done so sufficiently to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Courts have considered solely the 
location of the law of nations violation and solely the location of the 
relevant conduct (to be distinguished from the law of nations violation); 
counted and discounted U.S. citizenship; and rejected wholesale the 
notion that courts have a role in determining when the presumption can 
be displaced. A multifactor test, drawn from Kiobel and international 
jurisdictional norms, could provide a clear and predictable approach to 
aid courts in determining whether the ATS’s presumption against 
extraterritoriality should be displaced. 
 
 113.  Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d at 528–29; Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 322. 
 114.  Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d at 529–30; Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 323–24. 
 115. Ahmed v. Magan, No. 10-CV-00342, 2013 WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013). 
 116. Id. at *1–2. 
 117. Id. at *2. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See supra Part I and note 76. 
 120. The court deemed the presumption displaced even though the defendant was only a U.S. 
resident and not a U.S. national. 
 121. Magistrate Judge Mark R. Abel entered final judgment against the defendant and awarded the 
plaintiff five million dollars in compensatory damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages. Magan, 
2013 WL 4479077 at *7. The court held that the defendant had, at any rate, waived its ATS-based defense. Id. 
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II.  Divining Balancing Factors from KIOBEL’s  
“Touch and Concern” Test 
In frustratingly few words, the Supreme Court, in Kiobel, intimated 
how plaintiffs might establish an ATS claim based, in part, on 
extraterritorial conduct.122 The Court stated: 
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United 
States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of 
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are 
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that 
mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine 
otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.123 
Appearing at the end of the opinion, this language provides ATS 
plaintiffs with an “out” that seems almost irreconcilable with the Court’s 
prior attenuated discussion about the imperative of applying a statute to 
domestic conduct only, unless something in the statute compels 
otherwise.124 Here, the Court suggested a way to rebut the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS that is, arguably, external to 
the statute. 
Justice Breyer opined, though, in his concurring opinion, that he 
would dispense entirely with the presumption against extraterritoriality 
as a relevant canon of statutory interpretation for purposes of the 
ATS.125 Instead, he would seek guidance from “international 
jurisdictional norms”126 but recognize “jurisdiction only where distinct 
American interests are at issue.”127 In his view, the ATS: 
[P]rovides jurisdiction where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American 
soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s 
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American 
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the 
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as 
criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.128 
 
 122. Professor Cleveland correctly notes that this is the “most important part of the majority 
opinion.” Cleveland, supra note 8, at 9. She also importantly observes that “the opinion states that it is 
‘the claim’ that must touch and concern the United States, not ‘the conduct.’ In other words, the concerns 
underlying the presumption would allow for considerations not limited to the locus of conduct.” Id. at 21. 
(emphasis in original). 
 123. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 124. See id. at 1661 (“[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it 
has none . . . .” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010))); id. at 1669 
(“We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the 
ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”). 
 125. Id. at 1671–72 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 126. Id. at 1673. 
 127. Id. at 1674. 
 128. Id. 
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It is discussion about the latter consideration—preventing the United 
States from becoming a safe harbor for a torturer or their ilk—that 
formed much of Justice Breyer’s concurrence. This concern 
acknowledges the requirement, at least to Justice Breyer, that there be 
an available court for litigating human rights claims, and the leadership 
role of the United States in creating and preserving this space.129 
However, while Justice Breyer’s concern is clear, his three-pronged 
test is less so. It is unclear whether this first prong contemplates solely 
the direct injury to the plaintiff or also the predicate acts that gave rise to 
the direct injury,130 ratification of the direct injury, ratification of the 
predicate acts, etc.131 Likewise, it is unclear whether the second prong 
refers to individuals as well as corporations.  
It is clear, however, that prongs one and two do not contemplate a 
foreign-cubed case. While theoretically prong three could embrace a 
foreign-cubed case—given that the conduct in that case could 
substantially and adversely affect an important American national 
interest; for example, providing forced laborers with access to a 
remedy132 or bringing to justice a material supporter of genocide133—
Justice Breyer did not deem the conduct alleged in Kiobel, including 
 
 129. Indeed, Justice Breyer quoted Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004), stating: 
“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before 
him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” Id. at 1671 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732) 
(internal citation omitted). Invocation of this part of Sosa reifies the notion that Justice Breyer 
recognizes the role that the ATS can play in holding to account human rights abusers. 
 130. One cannot merely assume that Justice Breyer means both direct and indirect harm by this 
prong—despite the fact that he invoked section 402 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, 
which advances the idea that territorial jurisdiction be based on both direct and indirect activity—
given that he accorded no legal significance to the fact that the Kiobel plaintiffs accused the 
defendants of indirect liability and not direct liability. Indeed, he seemed to consider this allegation as 
further evidence of the propriety of not finding that the plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently touched and 
concerned the United States. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1678 (“The plaintiffs are not United States 
nationals but nationals of other nations. The conduct at issue took place abroad. And the plaintiffs 
allege, not that the defendants directly engaged in acts of torture, genocide, or the equivalent, but that 
they helped others (who are not American nationals) to do so.”). 
 131. As the discussion about the post-Kiobel cases shows, it is important to disaggregate what a 
court must consider when determining whether a claim touches and concerns the United States to 
ensure that a court consider all information relevant to that inquiry. See supra Part I.  
 132. The United States is a signatory to the U.N. Charter, the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which promote freedom, justice, and self-determination for all. See generally International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); U.N. 
Charter. 
 133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2014) (criminalizing genocide and recognizing jurisdiction over a perpetrator 
of genocide even if the genocide is not committed in the United States and the perpetrator is not a U.S. 
national, provided that the perpetrator is a permanent legal resident of the United States, “a stateless person 
whose habitual residence is in the United States,” or simply “present in the United States”). 
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aiding and abetting torture and other crimes against humanity, sufficient 
to warrant a finding of ATS jurisdiction, calling into serious question the 
allegations that could satisfy this prong. 
In the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), the companion 
statute to the ATS, Congress created a cause of action for torture to be 
brought by and against “individuals.”134 Courts have interpreted this 
right of action as belonging to both U.S. and foreign nationals.135 
Consequently, the TVPA is a clear example of the United States’ interest 
in providing victims of torture with access to a remedy. Moreover, the 
United States is a signatory to human rights agreements that forbid many 
of the very events alleged in Kiobel, including the Convention Against 
Torture, the U.N. Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.136 The 
TVPA was, in fact, passed “to carry out obligations of the United States 
under the United Nations Charter and other international agreements 
pertaining to the protection of human rights.”137 One would think the 
TVPA and these agreements sufficient evidence of U.S. interest in 
providing access to a remedy for torture. Failure to recognize ATS 
jurisdiction over a claim that includes aiding and abetting torture, even if 
committed by foreign nationals, would seem to undermine that interest. 
Perhaps under Justice Breyer’s third prong, the defendant or the tort 
must have some direct connection to the United States, for example, 
satisfaction of prong one or two, such that the defendant could more 
directly affect an “important American national interest” (in other 
words, such that the United States would be implicated, in some more 
meaningful way, by the defendant’s actions).138 
Justice Breyer’s last prong is also vague because it contains limited 
guidance as to the categories of American national interests that the 
ATS should protect. Moreover, Justice Breyer gave no guidance as to 
how and when to determine whether the defendant’s effect on such an 
interest is “substantial” or “adverse.” (Again, the aiding and abetting 
torture allegation of the Kiobel plaintiffs did not, according to Justice 
Breyer, rise to the level of “substantially and adversely affect[ing] an 
important American national interest.”139) Neither did he speak to the 
kind of “residence” in the United States that might give rise to safe 
 
 134. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Baloco v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian 
Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); see also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 137. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. 
 138. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 611–12 (observing that the defendants’ U.S. office was 
insufficient to satisfy Justice Breyer’s test). 
 139. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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harbor concerns. He does suggest that the United States could become a 
safe harbor for today’s pirates if there is no civil or criminal liability 
attached to their behavior.140 But given the existence of other sources of 
liability for torts that occur on American soil and torts committed by 
American nationals (for example, state law claims and the TVPA) and 
for related crimes (for example, assault, battery, and conspiracy), Justice 
Breyer’s safe harbor argument, without qualification, may never be a 
credible basis for exercising ATS jurisdiction over an alleged customary 
international law violation. 
Whatever questions these offerings raise, they do nonetheless 
provide some of the anatomy for a broader touch and concern test. 
Importantly, they underscore the primacy of “international jurisdictional 
norms” in determining when U.S. courts should exercise jurisdiction over 
customary international law claims. Indeed, an appropriate touch and 
concern test would not only contemplate but promote these norms. This 
Article seeks to do that by suggesting a test that considers, subject to 
reasonableness,141 territorial and national jurisdiction, two principles well 
established at international law. 
The proposed test has six factors. The first three factors align with 
these jurisdictional principles. Each of these factors, however, must be 
balanced against each of the last three factors of the test—which 
generally, although not exclusively, concern policy—for a court to 
determine whether an ATS claim sufficiently touches and concerns the 
United States to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. The 
factors are: 
1. The location of the alleged law of nations violation; 
2. The location of other alleged relevant conduct; 
3. The nationality of the defendant;142 
4. The demands of international comity; 
5. The likelihood that ATS jurisdiction denial could result in 
United States harboring a human rights violator; and 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Despite grounds for the exercise of each type of jurisdiction, a court must refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction if it would be unreasonable to do so. To determine reasonableness, a court must 
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: the link between the activity and the 
regulating state; nationality, residence, or economic activity in the regulating state; justified expectations; 
significance of the regulation internationally; consistency with international tradition; and another 
state’s competing regulatory interests. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 403 (1987). 
 142. This Article proposes alternative language to that in Justice Breyer’s first two prongs. The 
language chosen seeks to avoid the barrier to finding that the conduct at issue has touched and 
concerned the United States because the law of nations violation or other relevant conduct did not 
occur in the United States or the defendant is not a U.S. citizen. The proposed language might allow 
the factors to operate more freely as one of several factors to consider when determining whether the 
presumption should be displaced. 
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6. Any other American national interest that supports the 
recognition of subject matter jurisdiction.143 
If the alleged law of nations violation or other relevant conduct occurred 
in the United States, then barring a countervailing weight (for example, 
international comity demands and unreasonableness), a court would likely 
deem the plaintiff’s claim, pursuant to the territorial jurisdiction 
principle, sufficient to displace the presumption. The same would be true 
if the defendant is a U.S. national, pursuant to the nationality jurisdiction 
principle. 
In some instances a court’s disposition of the proposed touch and 
concern test will be more fraught politically, if not analytically. This will 
especially be the case if the alleged law of nations violation or other 
relevant conduct did not occur in the United States and the defendant is 
not a U.S. national—in other words, in a foreign-cubed case. 
Nonetheless, requiring courts to genuinely grapple with the propriety of 
exercising jurisdiction over this type of case is one of the goals of the 
proposed test. Presented with these facts, courts should engage in a 
refined analysis of the last three factors to determine whether the 
application of one of them alone, or in combination with one or more 
additional factors, warrants displacing the presumption. 
The possibilities for satisfying the proposed test, and thus displacing 
the presumption, are numerous—for example, alleged law of nations 
violation in the United States by a U.S. national with no compelling 
counterargument; other alleged relevant conduct in the United States 
plus a safe harbor argument, and no compelling counterargument; no 
alleged domestic tort or U.S. nationality, but allegations of heinous acts 
invoking the compelling American national interest in recognizing 
universal jurisdiction.144 Likewise plentiful are the possibilities for 
finding the test unmet, and thus maintaining the presumption—for 
example, failure of all factors; no alleged domestic conduct, no U.S. 
nationality, and no compelling American national interest; other alleged 
relevant conduct in the United States but compelling international 
 
 143. By contrast, Professor Steinhardt suggested that the touch and concern inquiry not,  
turn[] . . . on the territoriality of the wrong or the citizenship of the defendant but 
on . . . the nature of the breach; statements of interest . . . ; the exhaustion of local 
remedies . . . ; . . . the act of state doctrine and the political question doctrine; whether a 
federal court is a forum of necessity or forum non conveniens; and the links of the plaintiff 
to the United States.  
Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 843. 
 144. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 Va. J. Int’l L. 149, 
150–51 (2006) (“Unlike other bases of jurisdiction in international law, universal jurisdiction requires 
no territorial or national nexus to the alleged act or actors over which a state legitimately may claim 
legal authority. Universal jurisdiction instead is based entirely on the commission of certain ‘universal 
crimes.’” (citations omitted)); see infra Part II.F. 
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comity demands. A coherent touch and concern test can provide courts 
with a matrix for answering the challenging question of the ATS’s 
extraterritorial reach. A consideration of each test factor is below. 
A. The Location of the Alleged Law of Nations Violation 
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, a State 
has jurisdiction over “conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes 
place within its territory.”145 This principle of “territorial jurisdiction” 
codifies, in essence, the natural assumption that, as an attribute of 
sovereignty, a territory would have cognizance over events that take 
place within its borders. It is no stretch, then, for a court to deem a claim 
as sufficiently touching and concerning the United States, for ATS 
purposes, if the claim arises in the United States where U.S. courts are 
predisposed to recognize territorial jurisdiction, assuming no compelling 
countervailing factors or unreasonableness. 
Pursuant to this factor, not just any claim will do; the claim must 
consist of a law of nations violation. Moreover, the law of nations at issue 
must satisfy Sosa’s requirement of specificity and universal acceptance.146 
This factor most readily contemplates claims of direct harm suffered by 
the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s decedent at the hands of the defendant.147 
The claims that often result from this kind of harm are torture and 
extrajudicial killing, well-established law of nations violations that meet 
the Sosa standard.148 If these claims are premised on conduct in the 
United States, they would, given the territorial jurisdiction principle, 
sufficiently touch and concern the United States to warrant ATS 
jurisdiction. 
This factor might also be used, though, to determine whether 
behavior that gave rise to the direct harm (but did not constitute it) could 
still touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace 
the statute. For example, a plaintiff might allege that the defendant aided 
and abetted the direct harm and that the alleged aiding and abetting 
itself constituted a law of nations violation. Indeed, this aiding and 
 
 145. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(a) (1987). 
 146. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004); see supra note 53. 
 147. As a practical matter, the overwhelming majority of direct injuries in ATS cases will likely occur 
on foreign soil and, indeed, in a developing country. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also 
Penny M. Venetis, The Broad Jurisprudential Significance of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: An Honest 
Assessment of the Role of Federal Judges and Why Customary International Law Can Be More Effective 
than Constitutional Law for Redressing Serious Abuses, 21 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 41, 45–46 
(2011) (observing the prevalence of ATS cases that occur abroad and concern solely foreign actors). 
 148. See Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (regarding torture and 
extrajudicial killing); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1153–54 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (regarding 
extrajudicial killing). 
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abetting claim may be the only claim that the plaintiff brings pursuant to 
the ATS.149 
Aiding and abetting claims brought under the ATS are common 
because they reflect some of the alleged behavior of corporate 
tortfeasors.150 However, there is a question of whether aiding and 
abetting a customary international law violation is itself a customary 
international law violation subject to civil jurisdiction.151 There are other 
uncertainties in the law about the proper treatment of the aiding and 
abetting claim under the ATS.152 As a result, to evaluate such a claim 
under this factor, a court would have to determine: whether aiding and 
abetting claims are themselves customary international law violations 
subject to civil redress; whether they must satisfy Sosa153 (and, if they do, 
whether the claims satisfy the criteria); and the proper mens rea for this 
claim and whether the plaintiff has alleged it.154 If a court deems aiding 
and abetting cognizable under the ATS and the plaintiff properly states 
the claim, this should significantly advance the plaintiff’s touch and 
concern argument, particularly if the aiding and abetting occurred in the 
United States.155 
As discussed above, Justice Alito would read the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to mean that the ATS provides jurisdiction 
only for a law of nations violation that meets the Sosa standard and 
occurs in the United States (as opposed to other conduct relevant to the 
law of nations violation that occurs in the United States).156 While 
 
 149. See also Keitner, supra note 42, at 102 (“Although accomplice liability does in some sense 
depend upon wrongdoing by the principal, it can be adjudicated independent of the principal’s liability.”). 
 150. See Introduction, supra. 
 151. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and the Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 
85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1931, 1949 (2010) (observing that “aiding and abetting liability is well established 
in international law in the criminal context, but not necessarily the civil” (emphasis in original)). 
Further, at least one commentator believes that aiding and abetting liability may not even be available 
pursuant to the ATS given that the ATS provides jurisdiction for torts in “violation of the law of 
nations” and not for torts that aid and abet this violation. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 1834. Professor 
Bradley also opines that Congress, in a criminal statute enacted during the time of the ATS’s 
enactment, demonstrated that it knew how to expressly provide for jurisdiction over aiding and 
abetting liability claims and that it did not so provide in the ATS strongly suggests that Congress did 
not intend for the ATS to confer jurisdiction over this kind of liability. See id. 
 152. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 602–03. 
 153. See Wuerth, supra note 151, at 1947 (observing that aiding and abetting claims satisfy Sosa). 
 154. See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 320 (D. Mass. 2013) (in noting 
the propriety of bringing an aiding and abetting claim pursuant to the ATS, the court also recognized 
the intercircuit split on the proper mens rea for aiding and abetting liability under customary 
international law). 
 155. See Hoffman, supra note 58, at 46 (“Human rights violations committed extraterritorially at 
the direction of actors within U.S. territory will likely overcome the presumption.”). 
 156. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). If Justice 
Alito refers only to direct injury, then his interpretation is troubling for two key reasons: (1) many 
ATS defendants do not commit wholesale human rights abuses in the United States (they know better 
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deeming aiding and abetting a customary international law violation 
sufficient to ground ATS jurisdiction may not have been what Justice 
Alito had in mind (because this would not require the direct injury to 
occur in the United States), it may satisfy his test—that the law of nations 
violation occur in the United States.157 A court should consider whether 
any conduct short of a law of nations violation suffices to touch and 
concern the United States pursuant to the next factor. 
B. The Location of Other Alleged Relevant Conduct 
This factor takes into account the location of conduct that may not 
constitute the alleged law of nations violation itself, but is nonetheless 
material to the occurrence of the violation, furthers the violation, ratifies 
the violation, etc.158 Such conduct might include a variety of activities 
that give rise to the ultimate harm, such as planning, ordering, financing, 
or providing other substantial assistance.159 Any of the above conduct in 
the United States could, pursuant to the territorial jurisdiction principle, 
result in displacement of the presumption against extraterritoriality.160 
Courts would have to determine whether the claim before them contains 
the quantum of domestic conduct that warrants this displacement and if 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. 
The simple reality—as the Ruggie Report reveals—is that corporate 
human rights abuses abound161 and many of the victims of these abuses 
accuse corporations of planning, ordering, encouraging, or providing 
material support for a law of nations violation from the United States, 
sometimes with intent to cause the law of nations violation to occur 
abroad.162 The victims frequently bring their claims pursuant to the 
 
than to do that); and (2) failure to legally recognize the predicate acts to the harm potentially shields 
an entire category of malfeasance from legal liability. 
 157. It is unclear whether, pursuant to Justice Alito’s approach, the ATS would reach domestic 
and extraterritorial conduct if the ultimate harm and customary international law violation occurred in 
the United States but the predicate acts giving rise to the harm occurred abroad. There is nothing, 
though, about his framework that seems to deny this exercise of ATS jurisdiction. 
 158. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 608 (noting that the Court’s “touch and concern” language 
might mean that “something less than domestic conduct that violates international law under the Sosa 
test” could satisfy the test (emphasis in original)). 
 159. Id.; see also Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Degrees of Territoriality, Opinion Juris 
(Apr. 22, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/22/kiobel-insta-symposium-degrees-of-
territoriality (providing an expansive list of activities that might satisfy the touch and concern test, 
including “execution,” “cross-border conduct,” “planning and authorization,” “design and testing,” 
“training,” “construction,” “contracting,” “financing and money transfers,” “electronic 
communications,” “unlawful gains,” and “extraterritorial territory”). 
 160. A court might consider aiding and abetting claims pursuant to this factor if it concludes that aiding 
and abetting a customary international law violation is not itself a customary international law violation. 
 161. See supra pp. 450–52. 
 162. See supra pp. 450–52. 
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ATS.163 This factor provides an opportunity for courts to evaluate all of 
the conduct that is relevant to the claim brought under the ATS (other 
than the law of nations violation itself), determine where it occurred, and 
ultimately conclude whether, on balance and subject to reasonableness, it 
suffices to displace the presumption. 
C. The Nationality of the Defendant 
Justice Breyer would consider whether “the defendant is an 
American national” to help determine whether the conduct at issue 
touched and concerned the United States sufficient to displace the 
presumption.164 For reasons discussed below, this Article supports this 
notion but clarifies that this factor applies to both the corporate and the 
individual defendant.165 Whether juridical or natural, “an American 
national” has perhaps the strongest possible tie to the United States.166 
Consequently any claim against U.S. nationals must, by virtue of identity, 
touch and concern the United States.167 
Exercising jurisdiction based upon nationality would also align with 
an international jurisdictional norm, which contemplates jurisdiction 
over a national’s activities whether they occur inside or outside the State. 
The United States has codified the exercise of this jurisdiction in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,168 pursuant to which the United States 
 
 163. See Beth Stephens et al., International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 309 (2d 
rev. ed. 2008). 
 164. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also 
Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, 
SCOTUS Blog (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-
door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases (stating that post-Kiobel there may be “renewed focus of 
ATS litigation on U.S. corporations” (emphasis added)). 
 165. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 (1987). See generally Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). But see Balintulo v. 
Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190, n.24 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Nothing in the Court’s reasoning in Kiobel 
suggests that the rule of law it applied somehow depends on a defendant’s citizenship. Indeed, the 
presumption of extraterritoriality traditionally has ‘focused on the site of the conduct, not the identity 
of the defendant.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 74–76 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting))). 
 166. Moreover, as Professor Hoffman notes, the Supreme Court “will struggle to distinguish a 
future case involving extraterritorial international law violations committed by U.S. citizens from the 
[Attorney General William] Bradford opinion, one of the few historical records discussing causes of 
action cognizable under the ATS and finding the acts of U.S. citizens on foreign sovereign territory 
among them.” Hoffman, supra note 58, at 45. 
 167. Additionally, finding the touch and concern question satisfied on the basis of U.S. citizenship 
avoids international comity concerns. See id. Further, as Professor Hoffman writes: “The United 
States has an indisputable right under international law to apply such norms to its own citizens no 
matter where the offending acts occurred. Indeed, the United States may have a duty to do so.” Id.; 
See also Cleveland, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that “offenses committed by U.S. citizens against 
foreign nationals (who are the only valid plaintiffs under the ATS) would fall squarely within the state 
responsibility view of the purposes of the ATS”). 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2014). 
Doyle_20 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:22 PM 
February 2015]               EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN 473 
can exercise jurisdiction over a U.S. national for activities that allegedly 
occurred abroad. This statute, in part, prohibits a “United States 
person”169 from using “the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, 
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, 
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to”170 a 
foreign official to induce that foreign official to act in her official capacity.171 
Additionally, the nationality of the U.S. corporation is especially 
important to the touch and concern question because the U.S. 
corporation: (1) relies on the protection of U.S. laws;172 (2) resides in a 
country that is obliged, pursuant to international law, to provide alleged 
victims of human rights abuses with access to a remedy;173 and (3) resides 
in a country that has in recent years committed itself to the vision of the 
Guiding Principles,174 which expressly advocate providing victims of 
corporate human rights abuses with access to a remedy. For all of these 
reasons, if the defendant is a U.S. corporation, that fact should weigh 
strongly in favor of satisfying the touch and concern question and, thus, 
displacing the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
This factor also advances the Court’s apparent requirement that the 
corporate presence in the United States be significant in order to 
dislodge the presumption, given that in Kiobel the Court rejected “mere 
corporate presence” in the United States as sufficient to do so.175 By this 
 
 169. Id. § 78dd-1(g)(2) (defining “United States person” as “a national of the United States . . . or 
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated 
organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the United States or any State, 
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof”). 
 170. Id. § 78dd-2(a). 
 171. Id. § 78dd-2(a)(1). 
 172. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (“[T]o the extent that a 
corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and 
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations . . . .”). 
 173. The United States became a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) in 1992. The ICCPR speaks to the civil and political rights of “all members of the 
human family,” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Preamble, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, and expressly requires that the treaty’s signatories provide persons who claim a 
violation of their rights access to a remedy. See id. at art. 2 (“Each State Party . . . undertakes: (a) To 
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy . . . 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent . . . authorities . . . and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy . . . .”). 
 174. Daniel Baer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 
General Statement, Address Before the Human Rights Council (June 16, 2011), transcript available at 
http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/06/16/businesses-and-transnational-corporations-have-a-responsibility-
to-respect-human-rights (“The United States would like to . . . express our support and commitment to 
working to make the vision of the Guiding Principles a reality where it matters most—on the ground 
for people and businesses.”). 
 175. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). Justice Breyer agreed with the majority’s view and made clear that achieving the 
requisite level of corporate presence was not as simple as gaining general jurisdiction. Id. at 1678 
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language, the Court seems to be discussing corporate size and corporate 
ties. The Court’s language reflects a concern about the foreign 
corporation that has opened an office in the United States for limited 
purposes—for example, to provide a registered agent for service of 
process. This argument is furthered by the fact that the defendants in 
Kiobel were foreign corporations. The Court perhaps was commenting as 
much on the reality of that case as on the norm that should be followed 
in future ATS cases.176 Conversely, a defendant that is incorporated in 
the United States and operates therein as a going concern seems to be 
something other than “merely present.”177 The Court’s “mere corporate 
presence” language may well require a relationship between a 
corporation and the United States that is more explicitly linked—that of 
national to country.178 
The proposed touch and concern test should not fail, however, if the 
defendant is not a U.S. citizen. The plaintiff’s case simply would not be 
advanced based upon this factor. Any one or more of the other factors, 
on balance, could satisfy the test.  
D. The Demands of International Comity 
In recent jurisprudence—Sosa, Kiobel, and Daimler AG v. 
Bauman—the Supreme Court has evinced an overarching concern about 
possible intrusion into another sovereign’s activities if U.S. courts were 
to recognize ATS jurisdiction.179 This factor appeals to that 
preoccupation. It also comports with international jurisdictional norms, as 
it would require a court to consider the interests of foreign sovereigns180 
and the executive branch as grounds for recognizing or denying ATS 
jurisdiction, subject to reasonableness. 
As with factors one through three, this factor should operate freely 
so that a court might truly measure whether it weighs in favor of ATS 
jurisdiction denial. Without this factor—framed in these terms—there is 
the risk of courts drawing the line of permissible federal judicial activity 
 
(Breyer, J., concurring). Moreover, the Justice opined that the corporate presence must be sufficiently 
great that failure to provide a human rights liability scheme could result in the United States harboring 
a human rights violator. Id.; see also Wuerth, supra note 12, at 612 (“The facts of Kiobel did not satisfy 
Justice Breyer’s test, however, as the defendants’ only connection to the United States was a New 
York office owned by an affiliated company that helped attract capital investors.”). 
 176. The sentence “[c]orporations are often present in many countries,” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669, 
also begs explanation. Again, though, the Court seemed to be focused on companies that are not “at 
home,” whether foreign corporations that are operating in the United States or U.S. corporations that 
are operating abroad. 
 177. See supra note 169 and accompanying text; supra pp. 473–74. 
 178. One could interpret this statement, however, to mean that no corporate presence, regardless 
of size, suffices alone to displace the presumption. 
 179. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
 180. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §§ 403(2)(g)–(h), 403(3) (1987). 
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too near. So, instead of reacting precipitously when entertaining a matter 
with significant foreign connections, courts should fully engage the 
questions of competing foreign interests and foreign affairs intervention. 
To do this, courts should not assume the existence of an international 
comity issue, warranting ATS claim dismissal, merely because the claim 
at issue is foreign-cubed or foreign-squared (a foreign plaintiff and a 
foreign defendant or a tort that occurred in a foreign country).181 It also 
means evaluating the propriety of ATS jurisdiction pursuant to the other 
proposed factors—irrespective of possible international comity issues—
especially those that seek to determine whether the denial of jurisdiction 
could reasonably result in the United States harboring a human rights 
violator, and whether there exists an important American national 
interest that should be vindicated. The result of these inquiries could 
warrant overriding any international comity concerns. 
Imagine a case brought in the United States, pursuant to the ATS, 
by former child soldiers, citizens of another country, against a foreign 
corporation for aiding and abetting a foreign paramilitary group in 
torturing the children. The paramilitary group funds its activities through 
the sale of “conflict minerals.” The activities of this paramilitary group 
are condemned globally and the conflict violates international law. All 
relevant events occurred abroad. The country where the events occurred 
does not want the U.S. court to recognize jurisdiction. This country would 
deem the rejection of ATS jurisdiction an exercise of international comity. 
This request notwithstanding, one American national interest 
perhaps should give the court pause: The United States opposes even 
indirect financial support of those engaged in illegal conflicts, as 
evidenced by the new Securities and Exchange Commission conflict 
minerals rules.182 This factor would allow a court to balance this interest 
against that of the foreign country183 before summarily denying ATS 
jurisdiction on international comity grounds.184 
U.S. courts should certainly give all due deference to a foreign 
government—especially that of the country where the direct harm 
occurred and possibly that of the defendant’s resident country—if it 
requests that U.S. courts deny ATS jurisdiction.185 However, it is 
 
 181. As fairly recent cases reveal, international comity may demand recognition of ATS 
jurisdiction. See generally Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Mamani v. Berzaín, Nos. 
07–22459–CIV, 08–21063–CIV, 2014 WL 2069491 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2014). 
 182. See 17 CFR § 240.13p–1 (2012); supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 183. A court could also evaluate a circumstance such as the one presented under the last factor, 
concerning the protection of American national interests. 
 184. A U.S. court might choose to recognize jurisdiction pursuant to this factor if the country 
requesting abstention cannot itself provide the plaintiffs with access to a remedy. 
 185. There are, of course, other very practical issues which courts must address when determining 
the propriety of invoking international comity as a ground for rejecting ATS jurisdiction, including 
determining the status of the person who is best poised to make the international comity argument on 
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conceivable that the interests of the United States and the objecting 
foreign country would conflict. In that instance, protection of the 
American national interest should prevail, despite the comity demands. 
This is especially the case where one or more of the other factors 
denominated above (or an allegation of a universal offense, such as 
genocide, slavery, piracy, and war crimes186) suggests that the United 
States recognize ATS jurisdiction.187 
E. Likelihood That ATS Jurisdiction Denial Could Result in the 
United States Harboring a Human Rights Violator 
Congress passed the ATS, in part, to provide jurisdiction over 
pirates,188 those persons who act everywhere but should be at home 
nowhere. The ATS provided a means for ensuring that pirates would not 
be at home in the United States as they might be haled into a U.S. court 
and held accountable for their actions.189 This safe harbor concern 
persists today, as Justice Breyer opined in Kiobel.190 
As noted above, Justice Breyer suggested that ATS jurisdiction lie 
where “the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct 
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor 
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common 
enemy of mankind.”191 This Article suggests that whether the 
defendants’ conduct substantially and adversely affects an important 
American national interest and whether the choice not to recognize ATS 
jurisdiction could result in providing safe harbor to a human rights 
violator be considered separately to encourage a discussion on each 
issue. This Subpart discusses what a court should contemplate when 
determining whether the denial of ATS jurisdiction could reasonably 
result in the United States harboring a human rights violator. (The next 
 
behalf of foreign interests—a foreign government representative? If so, which? A party to the suit? A 
trade association? Scholars? Whom? 
 186. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (1987). 
 187. Additionally, failure of the United States to recognize ATS jurisdiction could, in some 
instances, create the very international strife that it seeks to avoid by invoking international comity, as 
the court in Lively observed. See supra pp. 461–62; Marco Basile, The Long View on Kiobel: A Muted 
Victory for International Legal Norms in the United States?, in Agora: Reflections on Kiobel, supra 
note 8, at e-13, e-17 (“[D]eclining to adjudicate a case involving an international issue can affect 
foreign relations as much as hearing the case.” (citing Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign 
Policy, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 28, 2008, at MM50)). 
 188. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (finding that pirates are an enemy of all mankind); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding that “[i]nternational norms have long included a duty not to 
permit a nation to become a safe harbor for pirates (or their equivalent)”) (citations omitted). 
 190. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671–73 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 191. Id. at 1674. 
Doyle_20 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:22 PM 
February 2015]               EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN 477 
Subpart will discuss other reasons, consistent with American national 
priorities, why a U.S. court might recognize ATS jurisdiction.) Further, 
this Subpart contends that the availability of alternative civil liability be 
considered only where federal courts and federal law are concerned. This 
Subpart also suggests that the availability of criminal liability not be 
considered at all. 
Any of the following in the United States should trigger a court’s 
inquiry concerning “harboring”: citizenship, nationality, incorporation, 
residency, or significant corporate presence.192 If “harbor” means to 
provide shelter,193 then citizenship, nationality, incorporation, and legal 
permanent residency are proper considerations because they essentially 
mean that the “home” (or at least a home) of the citizen, national, 
corporation, or resident at issue is the United States.194 
Further, to evaluate whether denial of ATS jurisdiction could result 
in the United States harboring a corporate human rights violator, 
assuming that the corporate defendant is not a U.S. national, a court 
must first consider whether the corporate presence at issue is significant. 
To wit, a court must determine either that the presence is so 
unremarkable that failure to exercise ATS jurisdiction could not 
reasonably result in the United States harboring a human rights violator, 
or the converse. A court could measure significance by evaluating the 
following factors: (1) corporate headquarters in the United States; (2) the 
amount of annual revenue, in raw dollars, derived from the U.S. market; 
(3) the number of employees in the United States; (4) the number of 
offices in the United States; (5) the benefits, including tax breaks, 
received by virtue of operating in the United States; and (6) the use of 
the United States’ legal system, including the filing of civil suits. 
Evaluating these factors, none of which is necessarily dispositive, should 
assist a court in determining whether the corporation is more than 
“merely present” in the United States and, if so, whether the extent of 
that presence could reasonably result in the United States harboring a 
human rights violator if a court does not recognize ATS jurisdiction. 
Considering these factors, amongst others, would prevent a court’s 
peremptory conclusion that a corporation does not have the requisite 
U.S. presence to displace the presumption. 
In determining whether the failure to recognize ATS jurisdiction 
would result in a safe harbor issue, a court should not consider the 
possible causes of action or jurisdictional grounds available to the 
plaintiff in state courts, as such a requirement would impose an undue 
 
 192. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 24, on the variety of circumstances that might give rise to “safe 
harbor” concerns (“Justice Breyer’s category at a minimum would capture such persons who later 
remain in the United States for a sufficient period to suggest that the country is a safe harbor.”). 
 193. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 529 (10th ed. 1994) (defining harbor). 
 194. This would be true even if the corporation at issue has a presence in another country. 
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burden on the court, and one of the purposes of the ATS is to provide 
federal jurisdiction for torts that are customary international law 
violations.195 So, even if the plaintiff could bring a state common law 
claim in federal or state court, such an option would arguably defeat the 
goal of the ATS. A court should, however, determine whether the 
plaintiff could bring another federal human rights claim against the 
defendant based upon another source of federal jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, out of a sense of fairness and respect for the plaintiff’s 
privilege as the master of their complaint, courts should only compare 
causes of action where the plaintiff can sue the same defendant sued 
pursuant to the ATS. 
The most obvious statutory alternative to the customary 
international law claims recognized by the ATS is the TVPA—a plaintiff 
would allege jurisdiction over a TVPA claim pursuant to the federal 
question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.196 The TVPA provides a 
right of action for an individual, a legal representative, or other rightful 
legal claimant against another individual for torture and/or extrajudicial 
killing committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of 
any foreign nation.”197 If, pursuant to the ATS, the plaintiff sued a 
natural person for a customary international law violation that required a 
showing of state action, and the plaintiff’s claims could credibly be 
refashioned as claims of torture and/or extrajudicial killing, the 
possibility of a TVPA claim might warrant denial of ATS jurisdiction. 
While there is overlapping focus between the ATS and the TVPA, 
there are also critical distinctions that may result in a claim under the 
TVPA being a poor substitute for one under the ATS. For example, under 
the TVPA, a plaintiff can only sue a natural person.198 Accordingly, 
under this statute, the plaintiff would be precluded from suing a 
corporation.199 Additionally, as just noted, TVPA claims are limited to 
torture and extrajudicial killing. Generally acceptable ATS claims, by 
contrast, include and extend beyond torture and extrajudicial killing to 
genocide, slavery, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.200 Moreover, 
 
 195. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting “the wisdom of the First 
Congress in vesting jurisdiction over [torts in violation of the law of nations] in the federal district 
courts through the Alien Tort Statute” and that “[q]uestions of this nature are fraught with 
implications for the nation as a whole, and therefore should not be left to the potentially varying 
adjudications of the courts of the fifty states”). 
 196. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2014). 
 197. Id. § 1350(2)(a). 
 198. Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012). 
 199. Even if the plaintiff were to sue an individual corporate agent, the plaintiff’s actual recovery 
in meritorious cases would likely be limited and the deterrence value of bringing a human rights abuse 
claim against a corporation dulled. 
 200. See Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Benchbook on International Law, pp. III.E-13–14 nn.42–49 
(Dianne Marie Amann ed., 2014) for a comprehensive list of relevant cases. 
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the plaintiff must prove state action for all TVPA claims,201 a significant 
hurdle202 that the plaintiff need not surmount with all ATS claims.203 
Therefore, if a plaintiff sued a corporation for a customary international 
law violation pursuant to the ATS, a court should consider the TVPA claim 
inapposite as another source of federal law. This is the kind of 
consideration that a court should make before denying ATS jurisdiction on 
the theory that the plaintiff could bring another federal human rights claim. 
Finally, a court should not consider the possibility of criminal 
liability for the defendants based upon the instant facts, as criminal 
liability does not have the capacity to compensate the plaintiff in the way 
that civil liability can and in the way that tort law in the United States not 
only allows, but promotes.204 In sum, information considered pursuant to 
this factor could weigh in favor of satisfying the touch and concern test if 
a court concludes that denial of ATS jurisdiction would result in the 
United States harboring a human rights violator. 
F. Any Other American National Interest That Supports 
Recognition of ATS Jurisdiction 
By stating that protection of “an important American national 
interest”205 might warrant recognition of ATS jurisdiction, Justice Breyer 
seemed to offer flexibility to courts confronted with the question of ATS 
jurisdiction but not the facts that would otherwise support this 
jurisdiction, such as domestic conduct or the defendant’s U.S. nationality. 
This Article agrees that courts should consider the national interest for 
the purpose of judicial flexibility, but expressly proposes that in the 
exercise of this flexibility, courts contemplate the propriety of ATS 
jurisdiction as a vehicle for “defin[ing] and prescrib[ing] punishment for 
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal 
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, 
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism”206 without 
regard to the requirements of territorial or nationality jurisdiction.207 
 
 201. § 1350 note. 
 202. See generally Bradley, supra note 4. 
 203. Several courts have concluded that some ATS claims, for example, genocide, war crimes, 
forced labor, aircraft hijacking, do not require state action. See generally Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, 
supra note 200. 
 204. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 2 (2000) (“Tort law is primarily intended to redress 
legally recognized harms by rendering a judgment against the wrongdoer. This award is usually a 
money award called ‘damages,’ and it is usually intended as a kind of compensation for the harm 
suffered.”). 
 205. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 206. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (1987). 
 207. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 618. This factor would allow courts to find ATS jurisdiction 
even where no relevant conduct, per se, occurred on U.S. soil (and the defendant is not a U.S. 
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Pursuant to its potential accommodation of universal jurisdiction, 
this factor might also provide the victims of universally condemned acts 
with their only possible remedy. Because many of these victims 
ultimately gain political asylum in the United States, proper application 
of this factor may require that courts more carefully weigh whether the 
claims are entitled to ATS jurisdiction.  
The Supreme Court, in fact, seems willing to treat plaintiffs and 
defendants differently, for ATS purposes, even when both first develop a 
connection with the United States after the occurrence of the events that 
gave rise to the tort. In Kiobel, the Court stated: “Following the alleged 
atrocities, petitioners moved to the United States where they have been 
granted political asylum and now reside as legal residents.”208 Despite 
acknowledging this very significant contact with the United States and 
the reason for granting asylum, the Court made no issue of it when 
evaluating whether plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently touched and concerned 
the United States. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer treated these facts 
no differently, opining that “the parties and relevant conduct lack 
sufficient ties to the United States for the ATS to provide jurisdiction.”209 
Conversely, in Kiobel, the Court approved the exercise of ATS 
jurisdiction in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala210 and In re Estate of Marcos 
Human Rights Litigation,211 suggesting that because, in each case, the 
defendant had moved to the United States after the occurrence of the 
tort in question and the allegations against them were of heinous acts, 
the United States had an interest in not providing a safe haven for 
them.212 
This disparate treatment is somewhat curious given that a plaintiff 
who has received asylum in the United States after a tortious event in 
their country—and perhaps because of the tortious event—cannot mount 
a claim against the defendant in their home country. While these facts 
would not transform a case with no “relevant conduct” in the United 
States into its opposite, they might warrant a finding of subject matter 
jurisdiction given the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the 
United States and the larger goal of furthering the American national 
interest of providing a victim of an act that is universally condemned with 
access to a remedy.213 This factor would allow a court to consider 
 
national). Pursuant to this factor, the location of the relevant conduct, in other words, might be 
inconsequential to the question of ATS jurisdiction. 
 208. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
 209. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 210. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 211. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 212. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 213. See McCorquodale, supra note 56, at 846 (noting that the Guiding Principles require states to 
provide access to remedy “especially where claimants ‘cannot access [their] home State courts 
Doyle_20 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:22 PM 
February 2015]               EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN 481 
allegations, perhaps not theretofore considered, to determine whether a 
significant American national interest could be advanced by the exercise 
of ATS jurisdiction. 
III.  Interaction with MORRISON 
In Morrison214 the Supreme Court held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applied to federal statutes.215 As a consequence, 
federal statutes apply only to domestic conduct unless they contain clear 
evidence otherwise.216 However, courts answering the question of a 
statute’s extraterritorial application should determine whether the 
conduct or relationship that was the focus of the statute occurred in the 
United States. If it did, this would suffice to displace the presumption.217 
If these conclusions provided the sole guidance for the ATS plaintiff with 
claims containing material foreign features, that plaintiff might have a 
limited chance of recovery. In Kiobel, however, the Court seemed to 
relax the restriction of the presumption against extraterritoriality by 
suggesting, if not outright creating, the touch and concern test, thus 
allowing plaintiffs to displace the presumption if the claims contain 
allegations sufficiently tied to the United States. This potentially enables 
plaintiffs to litigate ATS claims with more significant foreign attributes. 
The proposed test provides a mechanism, pursuant to the relative 
license granted by Kiobel, through which courts can find jurisdiction 
under the ATS, despite the potential limitations imposed in Morrison. 
The test generally aligns with Morrison in its effort to determine whether 
the domestic conduct or relationship at issue is the focus of the statute.218 
It also operates more broadly to consider whether the instant claim 
connects, in some other material way, to the statute’s focus.219 As noted 
 
regardless of the merits of the claim” (alteration in original) (quoting U.N. Human Rights Council, 
supra note 32)). 
 214. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 215. Id. at 254–56. The Court also explained that the question of the presumption’s applicability 
goes to the merits of the case and not jurisdiction. See id. at 254 (“[T]o ask what conduct [a statute] 
reaches is to ask what conduct [a statute] prohibits, which is a merits questions. Subject matter 
jurisdiction, by contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s’ ‘power to hear a case.’”). The notion of applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to a jurisdictional statute like the ATS has been disquieting, 
post-Kiobel, to say the least. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between 
Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 65, 66 (2013); Hafetz, supra note 18, at 
110–11; Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 841–42. 
 216. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. 
 217. Id. at 266. 
 218. Justice Alito emphasized the importance of this standard in Kiobel, noting that “only conduct 
that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations can be said to 
have been ‘the focus of congressional concern,’ when Congress enacted the ATS.” Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring).  
 219. Before discussing the importance of statutory focus to the question of displacing the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court, in Morrison, first rejected the “conduct 
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above, for a plaintiff to satisfy the first factor of the proposed test, the 
plaintiff must allege that the entire law of nations violation occurred in 
the United States. As law of nations violations “are the objects of the 
[ATS’s] solicitude,”220 the alleged occurrence of this event in the United 
States would be the most domestic activity that the statute contemplates 
and thus, would align with Morrison. However, if a plaintiff cannot 
satisfy this factor (because the alleged law of nations violation occurred 
abroad) that would not, under the proposed test, doom the plaintiff’s 
claim, as Kiobel allows for a consideration of the full contours of the 
plaintiff’s claim and not simply the location of specific conduct.221 
Factor two of the proposed test considers whether “other relevant 
conduct” allegedly occurred in the United States, such that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality might be displaced. This factor 
also seeks to ascertain the existence of any domestic activity concerning 
the alleged law of nations violation—the focus of the ATS—and 
therefore also allies with Morrison. As with the first factor, however, 
should a plaintiff be unable to satisfy this factor, the plaintiff could seek 
to ground ATS jurisdiction pursuant to another factor or set of factors. 
Factor three concerns the defendant’s nationality and would support 
the displacement of the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of the ATS if the defendant were a U.S. national. This factor 
aligns with Morrison because the focus of the ATS is to provide U.S. 
courts with jurisdiction over “aliens” who allege torts in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States. To do so, the statute must 
 
and effects” test of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, itself crafted to determine the 
extraterritorial application of a statute, § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The test 
considered: (1) “whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States”; and (2) “whether the 
wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.” 
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257. In rebuffing the test, the Court reasoned that nothing in the statute 
suggested or supported its use; the test was difficult to administer; and the test did not yield 
predictable results. Id. at 258–59 (citing SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 19–93 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Court 
held that the focus of § 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act is not “deceptive conduct” generally 
but rather “deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of [securities].’” Id. at 266–67 
(emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934)) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 
(2002)). Accordingly, for the presumption to be displaced the domestic conduct in question must 
concern “deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of [securities].’” Id. at 266. While 
at first glance it might appear that the proposed factors test is the conduct and effects test by another 
name, it is not. The proposed test does not focus on U.S. “effects” of foreign conduct. Although this 
would seem to be a worthy goal and one that is consistent with international norms, it is, instead, more 
concerned with the location and the materiality of the conduct itself, the nationality of the defendant, 
and policy considerations for courts, preoccupations that reconcile with international jurisdictional 
norms. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 403(2)(a) (1987); see also supra pp. 467–68. 
The test is concerned with the effect of a denial of ATS jurisdiction if that denial could reasonably 
result in the United States harboring a human rights violator or denying a human rights abuse victim 
access to a remedy. These are not the types of effects that the Supreme Court renounced in Morrison. 
 220. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267. 
 221. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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necessarily contemplate a defendant against whom the claim is to be 
brought, certainly including the defendant U.S. national. This factor does 
not perfectly align with Morrison because there the Court was unmoved 
by the U.S. nationality of some of the defendants and because it 
contemplates a foreign defendant. Nonetheless, it aligns with the goal of 
determining whether the ATS claim touches and concerns the United 
States. 
Factor four concerns the demands of international comity and 
relates to the ATS’s focus because courts can use the concept as a basis 
for recognizing the cause of action brought pursuant to the ATS, thereby 
vindicating the statute’s purpose.222 Moreover, a federal court’s power to 
act based upon international comity demands exists outside of—and 
perhaps even above—the concerns raised in Morrison, as it emanates 
from courts’ discretionary powers.223 As a result, it likely cannot, as an 
existential matter, conflict with the ATS’s focus. 
Factor five concerns safe harbor from liability and assumes the 
sufficiency of the underlying allegations—for example, an “alien” and a 
tort in violation of the law of nations, but also some jurisdictional defect, 
such as the foreign-cubedness of the claims. It concerns the focus of the 
ATS by prompting courts to question whether they may exercise 
jurisdiction in service of the larger goal of preventing the harboring of a 
human rights violator. It does not concern underlying domestic conduct. 
However, if U.S. courts are to seriously consider safe harbor concerns in 
ATS cases, limiting that consideration to only those cases where there is 
underlying domestic conduct that is the focus of the statute, as required 
by Morrison, would blunt the success of the undertaking from the start. 
Perhaps Kiobel would permit courts to consider safe harbor issues more 
expansively. 
Factor six is a catch all and, like most such factors, deliberately 
vague; it exists solely to allow courts to realize the goal of the ATS 
(barring a legitimate opportunity to do so based upon one or more of the 
other factors). This catch all factor would allow courts, where 
appropriate, to exercise jurisdiction over cases in which “aliens” are 
complaining of a tort in violation of the law of nations, the express focus 
of the ATS. The proposed test engages Morrison’s preoccupation with 
domestic conduct and extends it to the limit allowed by Kiobel, in pursuit 
of the larger goal of determining whether an ATS claim touches and 
 
 222. See supra pp. 474–75. 
 223. See also Voigt v. Fabricut, Inc., No. 10-CV-662-TCK-TLW, 2012 WL 1190660, at *3 (N.D. 
Okla. Apr. 6, 2012) (observing that “[t]he international comity argument is premised on the Court’s 
discretionary power to abstain from infringing on a foreign proceeding”); In re Regus Bus. Ctr. Corp., 
301 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting the court’s “inherent and discretionary power” to 
abstain from resolving an issue because of international comity amongst other concerns). 
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concerns the United States so as to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
Conclusion 
Currently, the touch and concern test, as presented by the Supreme 
Court in Kiobel, offers little guidance for determining when the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of the ATS might be 
displaced. This Article attempts to provide some direction by divining 
balancing factors based upon the Kiobel opinions and international 
jurisdictional norms. The proposed test operates within the lines drawn 
by the Supreme Court in Morrison and Kiobel together and seeks to 
appeal to the extant and growing international concern about providing 
access to a remedy for alleged corporate human rights abuse victims. 
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